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Abstract
This dissertation operates on the idea that, as conflict researchers, we can look to Islamic State’s
(referred to from here on as ‘Daesh’) own recruitment propaganda to identify the best people to
counter Daesh’s violent rhetoric. This project analyzes Daesh’s main print publication, Dabiq, to
catalogue and classify the types of people and institutions Daesh targets most, and which types of
arguments Daesh uses to attack those targets. It uses this information to test the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis, which predicts that the most effective peaceful interveners in a religious conflict will
be of the same religion as the belligerents. Conventional wisdom holds that Daesh, in choosing
targets to fight both on the battlefield and in its recruitment propaganda, prioritizes groups that
are less similar to it – for example, Jews and Christians. My analysis upends this conventional
wisdom, and in fact shows that the binary assumption of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis itself is
too simplistic. This dissertation finds, rather, that the most effective intervenors are found along
a Religious Continuum that identifies not only co-religionists, but also co-sectarians and cofundamentalists, and, further, non-co-religionists who are of different, but similar religious
traditions. These findings can help inform future peaceful counterpropaganda campaigns that
focus on religious conflict.
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My History with Daesh Propaganda
My introduction to Daesh propaganda came when I began working as a graduate research
assistant at The Carter Center, first with the Syrian Conflict Mapping Project, run by Christopher
McNaboe. In the conflict mapping project, we primarily focused on videos produced by Daesh
that detailed alliances formed between Daesh and other militant groups who opposed the Assad
regime. McNaboe made the novel observation that each of these groups, most of which were
comprised of defectors from the Syrian army, established a sort of ritual in which they did a short
speech for a Youtube video that detailed the numbers of fighters they represented, where they
were located, the purpose for the group, their enemies and their allies. Camera panning during
the videos frequently revealed the number and types of armaments the groups possessed, and
their location.
In the process, we also catalogued many other Daesh-related videos, which came in
several genres. Aside from videos that detailed alliances, Daesh also produced videos that were
intended to normalize, celebrate, and inspire terror – fighters would take captured fighters or
civilians and murder them in many different creative ways, such as suspending them in cages by
crane and slowly lowering them into pools filled with water, or hanging them head downward by
meathooks in a slaughterhouse intended for sheep or goats and slitting their throats one-by-one.
Countless videos depicted captured fighters or civilians digging their own graves, then being
forced to kneel in front of them as Daesh fighters dispatched them with shots to the back of the
head. As Daesh became more and more desperate in the face of major losses on the battlefield, a
subset of this genre emerged, with adult Daesh fighters coaxing or forcing their own children,
and those of captured minority groups such as the Yazidis, to execute unarmed prisoners. This

8

served the dual purpose of projecting terror across the Internet and also to so scar these children
that the violence and hatred of Daesh will continue to ravage the region for decades to come.
Other videos made emotional appeals to potential recruits, documenting chemical attacks
on civilians, purportedly by the armies of Assad, Russia, or Western states. These videos focused
on the devastation wreaked on the civilian population, characterizing it as an assault upon
Muslims in general, and repeatedly hammering the point home of Daesh’s perspective that this
was an existential conflict between the Islamic world and all the rest. The only choice for
Muslims, Daesh concluded, was to join forces with Daesh and fight off these forces, whose
purported mission was to eradicate all Muslims, kill them and destroy their religion, society, and
way of life.
My observations and analysis of Daesh propaganda continued with the Countering Daesh
Propaganda Project, also at The Carter Center. The project, run by Dr. Houda Abadi, analyzed
the full range of known Daesh online propaganda, monitoring and cataloging Daesh’s videos on
Youtube, its missives on Twitter, and its various attempts to maintain Facebook pages (which
were frequently taken down). It was here that I began seriously to analyze and code Dabiq.
Our coding sheet included for each issue of Dabiq the main theme, secondary and tertiary
themes, to whom it was directed, and countries and/or places named (other than Syria and Iraq),
and whether the issue had a predominately local, regional, or international focus. Under this last
heading we specified whether naming the respective locales signaled that Daesh was either
recruiting directly to groups, appealing to supporters, or naming the enemy.
We recorded the types of arguments, and whether they appealed to emotions, or to
history, or made theological arguments. We recorded each specific reference to the Hadith and
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Quran. In the final issue, Issue 15, included an additional section for references to the Christian
Bible. This was because this issue devoted much space to attempting to de-legitimize
Christianity by purportedly debunking key elements of the Christian faith.
Other categories we coded for included whether the magazine referenced outside media,
world leaders, the issue of citizenship in Islamic State, specific nation states, race or ethnicity,
gender, and religions other than Islam.
The remainder of our coding concerned formatting and layout issues, such as the
proportion of text to images, quality of text and images, the content of the images, and how each
issue of Dabiq used cross-platform promotion of Daesh’s propaganda in other media forms.
We did very little with the coding, however, which was surprising, since one of the most
important distinguishing factors of a fundamentalist religious group is its connection with its
sacred text. Daesh uses passages from its sacred texts first to establish its own identity and
legitimacy, next, to denounce and delegitimize other groups, and then to justify its practices in
territories it controls. Understanding how Daesh selectively interprets, re-interprets, and applies
passages from its sacred texts is a major key to understanding why Daesh recruitment
propaganda works so effectively, and, more important, provides valuable insight to inform
guiding principles in constructing an effective counterpropaganda campaign.
Because Daesh is a fundamentalist religious group, I consider its long propaganda in the
written, long-form magazine medium to be much more important for research and for
propaganda purposes in general than any of its other media, such as Twitter missives, Youtube
videos, or online message board arguments. Fundamentalist religious groups place an
extraordinary amount of emphasis on written communication, since it enables them to make
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lengthy and frequent references to their sacred texts, from which they seek to derive their
legitimacy (Appleby & Marty, 2009).
This is why I chose Daesh and Dabiq as the context in which I test my research question:
What types of figures provide the most efficacy in countering the propaganda of violent,
religious fundamentalists? In a religious conflict, what kinds of people might intervene
peacefully and most effectively – non-religious, religious, co-religious, co-sectarian, or cofundamentalist?

Research Question
This dissertation tests the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. The Co-Religionist Hypothesis posits that,
in a violent conflict in which religion plays a major role, the most effective people to intervene
peacefully will be of the same religion as the belligerents, i.e., “co-religionists.” Answering this
question essentially identifies the most effective messengers. But what about the most effective
messages? An obvious sub-question to be answered is whether the most effective messaging
aimed at waging peace in a religious conflict would be secular, religious, or co-religionist in
nature. I also seek to answer whether co-sectarians or co-fundamentalists embody the most
effective peaceful messengers.

Conventional Wisdom
The conventional wisdom regarding the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is that it is predictive. In
other words, the most effective intervenors in a conflict in which religion is a major factor would
be people of the same religion as the belligerents in the conflict. As I will describe in more detail
later in this dissertation, the few organizations that seek to use religion as a tool for peace tend to
assume the validity of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis.
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However, the conventional wisdom on the targets Daesh attacks, whether on the
battlefield or in its propaganda, is that Daesh targets less similar to Daesh. This runs counter to
the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. In the United States, and in parts of Europe, the conventional
wisdom assumes that Daesh poses more of a threat to targets that are not its co-religionists. In
other words, much of the West makes the assumption that Daesh preoccupies itself much more
with killing Christians and Jews than it does its fellow Muslims. Likewise, if this perceived (but
nonexistent) trend were to hold true in Daesh’s propaganda, its arguments would spend much
more time and space attacking the theologies of non-Muslim religions.

Critique/Unknowns
Going into this project, I did have some areas of uncertainty about research methods. Propaganda
by its nature puts before a researcher its own set of pitfalls. The primary goal of propagandists is
to influence large numbers of people to behave or believe in a certain manner. Objective truth,
while not irrelevant, is no more than a tool to be picked up and used when it facilitates or furthers
the primary goal, and to be set aside when it does not.
One unknown that I identified early on was the question of whether Daesh propagandists
would actually identify the figures who most threatened them. Would Daesh propagandists
actually identify the figures they feared, or would they misrepresent the reality in order to
obfuscate and distract from Daesh’s true vulnerabilities?
Another area of uncertainty, that occurred to me very early on, was how to isolate and
prioritize the individual factors driving radicalization and recruitment to Daesh. Is religion the
main driving factor? Or is it merely a façade, a vehicle with which Daesh mobilize fighters to its
cause? More important, if religion is or is not the primary driving factor for radicalization and
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recruitment, are religious figures and religious messaging really the most effective tools to aid in
a counterpropaganda campaign?
Delving into the motivations of fighters or “lone wolf” terror suspects proved especially
daunting, a prospect made even more complicated given Daesh’s propensity to claim terror
attacks that occurred in the West even when it had little or no direct contact with the perpetrators.
For example when a nominal Muslim attacks a gay club in Florida and slaughters scores of
people, was Daesh’s anti-Western, extremist religious messaging the inspiration for his violence?
Or was the shooter’s alleged closeted homosexuality to blame? Was it a combination of these
factors?
These are some of the uncertainties and unknowns that I encountered and pondered as I
completed this research. Moving forward in this dissertation, I trust readers will find that I have
addressed these questions adequately.

Methods
This research initiative is designed to answer the question of whether a co-religionist is more
effective as an initiator of an intervention intended to prevent violence, as compared to an
intervention made by someone who is viewed as secular or who is known to be a believer of a
different faith. I begin with a theoretical framework and a literature review. I then specify my
research question and methodology. Finally, I offer concluding comments about the relative
merits of quantitative as compared to qualitative research to test this hypothesis.
I allow Daesh propagandists to identify their vulnerabilities and their strengths by
categorizing the figures and institutions they respectively target or cite in their propaganda. If
they target certain figures more frequently or earlier, I predict these figures pose more of a threat
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to Daesh than other figures. If they cite certain figures more frequently or earlier, I predict these
figures bolster Daesh’s legitimacy more strongly than others.

Opportunity of ISIS data
Daesh and its written recruitment efforts provide one of the best possible cases with which to test
the co-religionist hypothesis. A co-religionist intervenor according to the hypothesis, will be
most effective if he or she is seen as being authoritative and devout within a particular religion.
Daesh’s messaging provides one of the most classic examples of this situation, as analysis shows
that the terrorist organization emphasizes authoritarianism and religiosity to a degree even more
extreme than Al Qaeda. Once viewed as one of the most extreme, violent, and dangerous terrorist
organizations in the world, Al Qaeda took a back seat to Daesh in this regard once the latter split
from the former. Textual analysis of the organizations’ respective flagship print publications and
platforms for recruitment, Inspire and Dabiq, shows that Daesh’s messaging may be more
effective than Al Qaeda’s in appealing to individuals who place a high value on authoritarianism
and religiosity (Vergani, Bliuc, 2018):
Daesh uses more violence against Muslims than Al Qaeda and commits atrocities against
local populations that are merely criticized by senior Al Qaeda members. Therefore, it is possible
that people who have personality traits that are highly authoritarian are more likely to be
attracted to Daesh because they are the only group that can meet the psychological needs that are
demanded by providing them with well-constructed justifications of such levels of extreme
violence (Vergani, Bliuc, 2018).
I have made Dabiq the focus of my research because it provides the only long-form,
written explanation, description, and justification for Daesh’s identity, world view, purpose, and
claims of legitimacy. The death of its chief editor, coupled with the Daesh’s coincidental loss of
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the city of Dabiq, which until that point had played a key role in Daesh’s apocalyptic narrative,
resulted in a radical decline in the quality of writing and editing, and perhaps more importantly,
the cohesiveness of its narrative. Besides the overall quality decline, the surviving producers of
Dabiq renamed it Rumiyah, Arabic for “Rome,” scrambling to reinterpret their apocalyptic
narrative in a clumsy attempt at damage control in their recruiting propaganda as major losses on
the battlefield scuttled their aspirations and pretentions of a global caliphate. Thus, I consider the
15 issues of Dabiq, first published during Daesh’s infancy and continuing through, and to the
end, of its rise to power, to be the best materials to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
Daesh’s extremist, violent ideology.

Assumptions
Because of the unprecedented success Daesh propagandists have met in recruiting fighters from
around the world, it is logical to predict that they are highly intelligent, rational actors. Their
highly-persuasive propaganda lends credence to their sophistication.
This dissertation operates on the idea that if Daesh propagandists attack certain
individuals or groups more frequently in their propaganda, they consider those targets to be more
of a threat to their propaganda efforts than other targets they attack less frequently.
This dissertation also operates on the idea that if Daesh propagandists attack certain
individuals or groups earlier, rather than later, they consider those targets to be more of a threat
than targets they attack later in the publication run of Dabiq. I will elaborate later on this
concept.
This dissertation further operates on the idea Daesh propagandists use intra-religious
argumentation more frequently and/or earlier in the publication run of Dabiq, than they use inter-
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religious argumentation, that means that Daesh considers arguing with other Muslims to be more
effective than with arguing with non-Muslims.

Preview of Findings
My research shows that Daesh spends much more time and space arguing against its coreligionists, fellow Muslims, than against any other groups. Daesh’s preoccupation with
discrediting and delegitimizing other co-religionists is so prevalent that it comprises the vast
majority of its argumentation, even when I combine all other religious arguments and mentions
together to compare.
What I find regarding Daesh’s choice of targets is that it attacks groups more frequently,
and earlier in the publication run, based on how similar they are to Daesh. Religious groups that
are less similar to Daesh get mentioned less frequently, and are mentioned later, rather than
earlier, in the publication run of the magazine Dabiq, the main vehicle of propaganda that I have
chosen to analyze.
Daesh tends to make more “intra-faith” arguments, as opposed to “inter-faith” arguments.
This means that, thanks to a peculiarity of Daesh’s style of transliterating Arabic to English
(which I describe and explain more fully later in this dissertation) I am able to categorize its
arguments and quantify how frequently Daesh makes theological arguments against its Muslim
co-religionists as opposed to making theological arguments against non-Muslims.

Implications
The implications of these findings are that the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is supported. Since
Daesh indicates its prioritization of co-religionist targets by attacking them more frequently and
earlier in the publication run of Dabiq, I conclude that Daesh fears co-religionists more than nonco-religionists. The main implication for conflict researchers and peace practitioners is that the
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best intervenors to recruit in order to counter Daesh’s recruitment propaganda are Daesh’s
peaceful co-religionists. More specifically, the most effective messaging for these peaceful coreligionists to use will focus heavily on the sacred text of the religion. This vulnerability may
help inform future counterpropaganda campaigns.

Role of Propaganda
I define propaganda as the deliberate and selective dissemination of facts (and sometimes
falsehoods) with the intent to influence public opinion or human behavior, or both. This
dissertation will focus on propaganda aimed at either promoting peace or fomenting violence.
Humans have used propaganda to recruit others to help them commit acts of violence as long as
acts of violence have been recorded in history. Many versions of history themselves could be
considered propaganda, a tendency summed up in the trite-but-somewhat-true phrase “winners
write the history books.”
Before the advent of mass media, subaltern narratives and records of propaganda
campaigns often disappeared quickly in times of conflict if the side of the propagandists lost
militarily. This was especially true before the advent of the printing press made it possible to
mass-publish propaganda. Without the ability to reach the masses, propagandists’ work remains
unrecorded, and therefore, irrelevant. Without the assistance of Johannes Gutenberg’s printing
press, Martin Luther’s translation of the Christian Bible from the priestly language of Latin into
the common language of German would have meant nothing, and the religious and political
revolution he sparked would never have happened.
Likewise, if the Internet and social media did not give air to the violent rhetoric of
violent, fundamentalist, religious groups like Daesh, their attempts to reshape the world would
go no further than the sands of Iraq and Syria. Now that the Internet and social media outlets
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have created a publishing platform for anyone with even just a smart phone, it enables violent
groups like Daesh to radicalize and recruit people around the globe to their cause. At the same
time, it also gives researchers an unprecedented opportunity to analyze the strategies and tactics
used by these groups to make their propaganda work.

How propaganda reveals values and strategies of propagandists
A propagandist’s values will reveal themselves in the propaganda itself. Some forms of
propaganda are subtle or oblique, but written propaganda from fundamentalist religious groups
generally is not. Religious fundamentalists by their nature are tied extremely closely to their
sacred texts, so their attempts to sway public opinion almost invariably will involve frequent
direct quotations from their sacred texts, and they will tend to at least attempt to give the
appearance that their arguments spring directly from passages therein (Appleby, 1997).
Religious fundamentalists, being literalists at heart, tend to state their goals and
objectives explicitly, and will often cite specific passages from their sacred texts to justify and
legitimize them. This tendency proves helpful to researchers. The difference between a
propagandist’s objectives and goals is that objectives are short-term, are easily met and can
change, while goals are long-term, and remain fixed (Jowett, 2019, p. 270). An example of this
contrast in the context of Daesh is that Daesh’s primary stated goal is to establish a new Muslim
caliphate, a quasi-state that controls large amounts of territory and provides sanctuary for the
world’s Muslims. One of the most important objectives Daesh put forward in its pursuit of that
goal was to seize and maintain control of the city of Dabiq. The fact that losing Dabiq did not
dissuade Daesh from its goal of establishing a caliphate means that this was merely an objective,
a means to an end, and not an end goal. Analysts seeking to identify propagandists’ values and
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strategies can use a 10-point system devised by propaganda experts Gareth S. Jowett and
Victoria O’Donnell, cataloging:
The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign; the context in which the
propaganda occurs; identification of the propagandists; the structure of the
propaganda organization; the target audience; media utilization techniques;
special techniques to maximize effect; audience reaction to various techniques;
counterpropaganda, if present; and effects and evaluation. (Jowett, p. 268)
Given the numerous records of propaganda campaigns that have been recorded since the
advent of the printing press, and the extensive analysis done on them since, researchers can be
reasonably confident in their endeavors to identify the values and analyze the strategies of
contemporary propagandists.

Conclusion: Daesh’s communications will reveal its values and strategies
Daesh has provided researchers with an abundance of propaganda materials to analyze. The fact
that Daesh propagandists are religious fundamentalists who possess not only excellent writing
skills and intuition for propaganda, but also an impressive aptitude for utilizing new media for
these purposes, gives researchers an excellent opportunity for analysis.
The success Daesh achieved in its global radicalization and recruitment campaign was
completely unprecedented in history. Never before was a single group with so little infrastructure
or resources able to use social media to recruit fighters in such tremendous numbers from around
the world to travel to a single region to fight for its cause.
Several characteristics about Daesh’s propaganda campaign make it clear that researchers
will be able to identify its values and strategies, and, further, identify its strengths and
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vulnerabilities. Daesh is a religious, violent fundamentalist group. As such, it relies heavily on
literal – albeit highly selective – passages from its sacred texts. It also is highly literate and
extremely literal in the rest of its communications. It is extremely explicit in stating its goals and
some, but not all of its strategies. It has been extremely prolific in all forms of media, and the
fact that it used the Internet for most of its messaging provides researchers with a vast trove of
propaganda materials to analyze.
All of these characteristics together make it possible for researchers to delve into the
motivations, values, strategies, and weaknesses of Daesh. That is what I intend to do in this
dissertation.

Preview of chapter contents
I include in the following series of paragraphs a preview of each of the following chapters.
My next chapter contains my Literature Review, which gives an overview of the relevant
research that has been published on this topic. Important concepts include the Ambivalence of
the Sacred, which is the concept that all sacred texts contain passages that endorse or command
violence, and also at the same time, all sacred texts contain passages that endorse or command
peace and coexistence (Appleby, 2000). Literature that describes the phenomenon of religious
fundamentalism helps explain the extraordinary connection fundamentalists feel to selectively
literalist interpretations of certain passages of their sacred text. My review of literature also
describes the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, and reveals the gap in the research that I seek to
address: the fact that this hypothesis has never been tested with empirical data.
Chapter 3, my Methodology chapter, explains how I will use Daesh propaganda to test
the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. This chapter describes propaganda, and in particular, Daesh
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propaganda, as an strategic, incremental, and iterative process in which Daesh uses specific
messaging at certain points and evolves its messaging to meet new or anticipated needs.
Chapter 4 describes Daesh and its origins, as well as giving an overview of its overall
propaganda outlets. I explain why the magazine, Dabiq, provides the best window into Daesh
propagandists’ motivations and strategic thinking, given the fact that they are religious
fundamentalists, and, as such, the extraordinary value they place on their sacred texts.
I use Chapter 5 to give the results of the tests I conduct on Dabiq, showing that Daesh
gives a much greater emphasis on attacking its fellow Muslims, or Co-Religionists, than it does
on attacking those who are from other religions or are secular.
I use Chapter 6 to conclude this dissertation, giving a recap of my main points, explaining
the implications of my findings, and providing a modest section on policy recommendations
based on the implications of my research. I now move to my Literature Review.
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature
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Compared to other fields of inquiry, conflict management is relatively young. Further, the idea of
investigating religion is even younger – nearly all the major scholars who have written about it
are still publishing research on it. As a result, this presents me and others in this niche with a
mixed blessing: on the one hand, it is not difficult to find large gaps in the literature that need to
be filled. On the other, unfortunately, this also means that the existing literature is rather thin.
The research question I seek to answer is whether co-religionists are the most effective
intervenors in violent conflicts in which religion serves as a major factor. As I have mentioned
previously, I am testing the Co-Religionist Hypothesis in the context of Daesh recruitment
propaganda. In this section I have sought to pull together the main arguments and theories
relevant to religion and peacebuilding, and to the Co-Religionist Hypothesis specifically.
This chapter begins with a section that outlines existing scholarly thought on the role
religion can play in fueling violent conflict. Readers likely will not find this surprising, as
religion has become something of a scapegoat in conversations about violent conflict, especially
since the terror attacks of 9/11.
Next, I discuss the idea of the “ambivalence of the sacred,” which refers to the fact that
most, if not all, sacred texts bear passages that respectively support, or seem to support violence,
while other passages in the same sacred texts advocate peace and coexistence. Thus, sacred texts
can be said to be “ambivalent” when it comes to violence (Appleby, 2000).
A third section gives an overview of the somewhat limited existing literature on the role
religion and religious figures can play in promoting peace or intervening in violent situations.
After this I will outline my research question and the gap in the literature that I aim to fill,
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followed by cautions from the literature and a brief discussion about mitigating factors that are
not addressed by the Co-Religionist Hypothesis.

Linking Religion to Conflict
This section will provide an overview of literature that analyzes the role religion can play in
promoting violence. For purposes of this dissertation, religious violence is defined as the threat
to harm or the act of harming people of a different religious identity (whether they be of a
different sect, or an entirely different religion) or of no obvious religious identity when violencepromoting political or religious leaders, or both, seek and secure the allegiance of people of faith
based on their beliefs. But not all violence based on religious identity constitutes religious
violence, as when followers of a political or religious leader neither know much about the faith
being exploited to cultivate violence, nor hold beliefs of that faith dearly. Such followers are
attracted to perpetration of violence because of a sense of alienation, a desire for adventure, for
belongingness, or a combination of the three (Guilain, 2009). They are not “holy warriors” in the
sense that they are following leaders of a faith out of religious conviction related to beliefs, but
engage with a group out of frustration in being alienated by the out-group, are bored, or hungry
for a sense of adventure or belonging, or all three (Guilain, 2009). Religious aggression is when
a violence promoting leader uses religious terminology or symbols, or both, to enhance tension
or incite violence against a group of people of a different sect, of a different faith or of no faith
and religious imperatives or religious differences become key motivators for the perpetrators of
violence.
It is important to distinguish between religiously-motivated violence and violence that
merely uses religion as a cover or excuse for its existence, because the methods used for peacebuilding counterpropaganda on the different groups could be different. For instance, a group that
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is deeply religious and feels motivated to commit acts of violence directly because of violent
passages in their sacred text might respond more to direct appeals to peaceful passages from that
sacred text. A group that is not deeply religious and is merely using religion as a cover or excuse
for their violence might be more readily persuaded by appeals from authoritative religious
figures simply because of their perceived legitimacy, rather than complex arguments from the
sacred text. The reason this is important is that in the context of campaigns of propaganda and
counterpropaganda, a project will not be effective if it does not send messaging that will resonate
with its target audience.
Iniquity Theory, developed by Bock and McCauley (2003), helps distinguish religiouslymotivated violence from identitarian violence that uses religious labels. In this work, religious
conflict is defined as: “How religious leaders with credibility within a faith community can
artfully appeal to a sense of honor and sacred duty, urging followers to become violent when
facing an offense to what is deemed sacred” (p. 235).
In this view, the outrage that can arise from a perceived offense against the sacred
can prove to be a strong motivation to commit acts of violence. Arguments along these
lines have the power to convince people to commit acts that otherwise would appear not
to be rational, such as suicide bombings.
Interconnected with these concepts is social identity theory, which holds that the
competition of identities can drive conflict, and that religion provides a unique framework for
identifying oneself, for relating to others, and for interpreting observable phenomena, both
predictable and unpredictable. Religion answers human beings’ need for identity in a way that no
other cultural construct has. While competition over finite resources might constitute the root
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cause of a conflict, religious identity can exacerbate division, since identity, unlike other human
needs for finite resources such as food, shelter, and water, is, for all practical purposes, nonnegotiable. Further, while some so-called religious conflicts are not actually caused by religion
per se, religious identity consistently provides a convenient fault line along which combatants
can align (Seul, 1999; Elliott & Bock, 2017).
A common, emerging thread is that much of the current scholarship focuses on the
fundamentalists, extremists, and the violent passages in the sacred texts (Almond, Appleby &
Sivan, 2003; Marty & Appleby, 1996; Marty & Appleby, 1997; Marty, 2004; Marty & Appleby,
2004). It is helpful to distinguish a fundamentalist, however, who believes fundamentally or
literally what a text says, as compared to an extremist or militant, who may or may not hold such
beliefs but nonetheless uses violence in the name of religion against other groups. This is an
important distinction, because, while many of those who perpetrate religiously-motivated
violence are fundamentalists, not all fundamentalists are violent. This distinction is important
because non-violent religious fundamentalists could prove to be the most effective peaceful
intervenors in a conflict driven largely by violent religious fundamentalists.
All major religions have traditions of violence, and these traditions have been used to
foment further violence from the beginning of history. Religious language tries to make sense of
disorder, to give an explanation for the seemingly inexplicable, and provide reassurance in the
face of unpredictability. Themes of violence and death, therefore, are replete throughout the
language of most religions as these problems are logically some of the most important
occurrences for religion to address (Appleby, 2000). Religion serves many purposes in society,
one being that it fills in the cracks in our knowledge and understanding of the universe, and most
important among these – simply because they deal with our own mortality – are the mysteries of
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life, death, and violence (Ioffe, 2016). Religions throughout history have also helped create basic
structures to help order societies, such as codes of law, courts, governments, as well as
establishing societal norms and customs that facilitate senses of identity and community.
As has been previously mentioned, the texts of the world’s three major monotheistic
religions (Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) contain violent and peaceful passages. Other
religions that popular opinion may associate with less violence, such as Buddhism, also still
contain passages that endorse limited violence, such as in defense of one’s community (Berkley
Center, n.d.). And clearly, as seen in the case of the slaughter of Muslim civilians in Myanmar,
Buddhist-majority societies are not immune from committing large-scale atrocities against
minorities in their communities (BBC, 2013).
To summarize, religion has a well-documented capacity for playing a role in inciting
violence. Religious leaders occupy a unique position in society that can give them the power to
legitimize acts or even campaigns of violence that otherwise might never be considered.
Religious texts do contain passages that seem to endorse and explicitly prescribe acts of violence
and even genocide. This is important for policy-makers, practitioners, and researchers to
consider and to bear in mind when attempting to design or implement an intervention aimed at
conflict management or transformation.

Ambivalence of the Sacred
What is much less researched or publicized is the fact that religion can also be used as a tool for
building peace. Religious texts not only contain passages that promote violence; they also have
multiple passages that promote peace and inclusion. This is known as the “ambivalence of the
sacred,” a view that religion plays dual roles in either building peace or promoting violence. This
so-called “ambivalence of the sacred” is important to consider in any discussion about the role of
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religion in conflict management, since sacred texts provide the basic framework for their
respective religions, and arguments for and against violence in a religious context will
necessarily spring from them (Appleby, 2000).
In analyzing the existing literature on the topic of the role of religion in peacebuilding,
one of the most important, for purposes of this dissertation, is the idea of the “ambivalence of the
sacred,” a phrase referring to the fact that the theologies or dogmas of all major religions can
seem to support the use of violence to achieve their ends at some times, and at other times can
condemn the use of violence or support peace (Appleby, 1998). Practitioners or theologians have
been seen to use certain passages or teachings from different portions of the various sacred texts
to support their agendas, whether peaceful or violent, at different times. According to Appleby,
sacred texts of most, if not all, major religions show ambivalence at best toward the use of
violence to achieve one’s ends. Most sacred texts can be used to either condemn or condone
violence, depending on which passages one chooses to reference. Since religion by Appleby’s
definition is a yearning for transcendence, a desire and search for meaning beyond the temporal
and finite, it lends itself to the justification of killing or martyrdom in its name. Appleby (2000)
demonstrates this consistency by examining the sacred texts of Islam, Hinduism, Judaism,
Buddhism and Sikhism, all of which at different times provide sacred texts that variously oppose
and support violent acts.
Another dimension of “ambivalence of the sacred” is the internal pluralism found within
major religions. Internal pluralism refers to the fact that these major world religions have
evolved and diversified over the centuries to the point where each one has its own internal
divisions and arguments over the meaning of the religion and what characteristics and tenets
comprise its authentic core. Appleby (2000) sees this as a positive development in the context of

29

peacebuilding, in that this demonstrates all of these major world religions are adaptable to
specific contexts. Perhaps the most important concept Appleby brings to the discussion is the
idea of “ambivalence as opportunity,” as he points out how the near-ubiquitous nature of
religions lends itself as tools for peacebuilding throughout the world in a variety of contexts (p.
218).
However, to use ambivalence as opportunity, religious intervenors must be seen as
legitimate actors within their own religion, and within their communities. Legitimacy becomes
extremely important in the processes of either building peace or building consensus toward
violence. In the context of peacebuilding, during periods of anarchy or a weakening of state
institutions, some scholars claim that religious institutions and figures tend to rise to the fore in
the public discourse as the most legitimate actors (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, 1998).
A final theme that emerged from the literature is that analyses of sacred texts of many of
the world’s major religions indicates that all of them can and have been used to justify the use of
violence. For instance, passages in the Hebrew Bible and also in the Quran seem to explicitly
proscribe genocide:
Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but
slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass (I Samuel
15:3, KJV).
And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and polytheism: i.e. worshipping
others besides Allah) and the religion (worship) will all be for Allah Alone [in the whole
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of the world]. But if they cease (worshipping others besides Allah), then certainly, Allah
is All-Seer of what they do (Quran, 8:39).
It is not difficult to find concrete examples of religious leaders using scriptures such as
these to justify, and even to command acts of violence by their followers. Christians in the
antebellum South used Christianity to justify slavery, citing passages in the Bible commanding
servants to obey (Zauzmer, 2019). More recently, specific passages in the Bible, most notably
Romans chapter 13, have been used to justify police shootings of minorities and to condemn
protest movements such as Black Lives Matter (Markon, Nirappil & Lowery, 2016). Protestant
theologian Otto Dibelius even used this chapter in 1933 to urge Germans to support Adolf
Hitler’s Nazis during WWII (Weber, 2018). And, as will be described later, Daesh uses passages
from the Quran and related sacred texts to justify and command acts of violence, including
genocide, torture, unusual execution methods (beheadings, burning to death in a cage, and
crushing the skulls of unarmed prisoners with boulders), and sexual slavery.
As stated earlier, sacred texts of most major world religions explicitly or implicitly speak
approvingly of the use of violence. Less well-documented is the analysis of sacred texts to
support non-violent methods or condemn the use of violence. One example of a passage, again
from the New Testament of the Bible, that endorses peace is found in II Thessalonians 3:16
(KJV):
Now the Lord of Peace himself give you peace always by all means. The Lord be with
you all.
Historic examples abound of theologians and political leaders using sacred texts to
promote peace. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., for instance frequently quoted the Bible in his
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speeches, and used the Greek term agape, which in the Bible to means love or understanding, to
support his non-violent movement as he strove for civil rights (Carson, Carson, Clay & Taylor,
2005). Christian ministers and theologians used many specific Biblical passages to craft the
Kairos Document, which was widely used in churches in South Africa and was instrumental in
throwing off apartheid. The Kairos Document, and the scriptures it cites, subsequently have been
used in many other countries and regions, most notably, Palestine, to promote civil rights and to
delegitimize state violence (Kairos, 2019). And, as will be discussed later, religious leaders
within the Muslim faith similarly have proven instrumental in using the Quran and related sacred
texts to argue against the use of violence.
Further, the dynamism of hermeneutics within faith traditions is evident in the strikingly
different views of Walter Wink (1984, 1986, 1992, 2003), who critiques atonement theology
within Christianity and argues that Christ’s crucifixion was not to pay for the sins of humanity
but was, rather, a result of Christ being willing to die, to risk everything, to “engage the powers”
of empire. Compare that to the view of Juergensmeyer (2001) who argues that religion uses
images of limited, symbolic violence to tame it and reassure the religious that order will
overcome chaos, as in this example:
In Christianity … the very normalcy with which the blood-filled hymns are sung
and the Eucharist is eaten indicates their domestication. In ritual, violence is
symbolically transferred. The blood of the Eucharist wine is ingested by the
supplicant and becomes part of living tissue; it brings new life. In song a similarly
calming transformation occurs. For, as Christian ideology explains, in Christ
violence has been corralled. Christ died in order for death to be defeated, and his
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blood is that of the sacrificial lamb who atones for our sins so that we will not
have to undergo a punishment as gruesome as his (p. 180).
Violent imagery, even if “domesticated,” or “tamed,” still can be used to promote
violence when wielded by charismatic leaders. When religious leaders promulgate martyrdom or
the committing of violent acts as proof of being a true believer, this puts followers in an
extremely difficult position, as refusing to commit violent acts could result in expulsion from the
group, and the stakes would already be very high, given the obvious willingness of the group to
commit such violent acts against “the other.” While in most cases, those occupying only the most
extreme fringes of a religion will carry out violent acts, they frequently are given financial and
moral support by a much larger swathe of the group. Examples of this can be seen in the Middle
East, in Northern Ireland, and along the Pakistan-India border (Selengut, 2003).
Another idea in this theme is that religious calls to commit violent acts can prove
especially effective because religious followers think differently than do secular thinkers.
Religion can emphasize non-rational ideas, such as faith, ritual, and paradox (Hobson,
Schroeder, Risen, Xygalatas & Inzlicht, 2018). “Paradox” in a religious context is defined by
Hugo Slim (2005) as the idea that:
God often requires what is counter-intuitive and contradictory to human
reasoning. In many religions, God is experienced as working more through
paradox than anything else and a great deal of religious teaching and truth is a
celebration of the transforming power of the paradoxical in human life. Thus, it is
common for almost every religion to value paradoxical ideas such as: people find
most when they are lost; have everything when they have nothing, are strongest
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when they are weakest, are triumphant in defeat or are remade in the moment they
are destroyed. (p. 3)
When this idea of paradox is embraced, it is not such a leap to view the destruction of
oneself, as in a suicide bombing, or others in the larger context of a “holy war” as the divine plan
of God and part of a larger picture of righting the world’s wrongs (Slim, 2005). This makes the
idea of paradox a powerful tool of leadership to politicize religion and mobilize people to
commit acts of violence who otherwise would see such acts as counter to their own interests (p.
5). Similarly, paradox can be used by religious followers who practice non-violence.

Religious fundamentalisms
For literature on the characteristics, origins, and behavior of religious fundamentalisms, I rely
heavily upon the descriptions, research, and analysis of the Fundamentalism Project, which was
directed by Scott Appleby and Martin Marty. The Fundamentalism Project was a 10-year
collaboration that enlisted sociologists, cultural anthropologists, political scientists, and
historians to observe and analyze religious fundamentalist movements around the world. It
resulted in a hefty five-volume set and was followed by multiple books by Appleby, Marty, and
others who participated in the project. By their definition, religious fundamentalist groups –
regardless of whether their “host religion” is Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism,
or Sikhism – function at their core as a rejection of secular modernity. Generally speaking, they
reject pluralism and the secular state, but they also share some other, more particular traits. The
following list of characteristics reflect a distillation of The Fundamentalism Project’s
descriptions.
Religious fundamentalists selectively reject novelty within their religion. However, they
happily create their own novel practices and interpretations as it suits their needs. Religious
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fundamentalists selectively interpret their sacred texts to define their religion. However, they
simultaneously claim not to do any such interpretation or cherry-picking, but rather that they
apply the entirety of the literal meaning of their sacred texts to a degree that no other of their coreligionists do. Religious fundamentalists share a fascination with the End Times and the
Apocalypse, and because of this they tend to rely on violent passages in their sacred texts that
bear some version of a ‘use only in case of emergency’ clause, and point to the encroachment of
secular modernity as signs of these being times of emergency. This in mind, religious
fundamentalists place a high value on a religious leader’s command of sacred texts, and appeal to
this authority in making their arguments for legitimacy (Almond, Appleby & Sivan, 2003; Marty
& Appleby, 1996; Marty & Appleby, 1997; Marty, 2004; Marty & Appleby, 2004).

Religion can also be used in peacebuilding
This section will discuss the major scholarly research that has been done on the role religion can
play in peacebuilding. As has been mentioned previously, this is a relatively young area of
inquiry, and the amount of existing literature on the topic is limited.
Religion is rarely, if ever, the root cause of conflict; even though most sacred texts
contain many implicit or explicit endorsements of violence. Conflicts that appear rooted in
religion are always anchored in earthly motivations such as the acquisition of power or resources
(Aslan, 2010).
While a practitioner or scholar can correctly observe the many examples of religion being
used as a tool for violence, attempting to demonize or eradicate religion itself becomes
problematic, because this creates yet another “us versus them” dynamic. An alternative to
diluting or eradicating religion is to embrace it, pointing out the space within respective religions
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for coexistence or for celebrating diversity. It is not necessary for adherents of one religion to
embrace the tenets of the religion of those on the other side of a conflict. Promoting coexistence
or celebration of diversity within the frameworks of each of the respective faiths and mutual
respect for those outside of their religion has shown success (Bock, 2001).
Some textual analyses have been conducted to determine which passages from certain
major religions seem to directly promote violence, such as John Renard’s (2012) Fighting
Words: Religion, Violence and the Interpretation of Sacred Texts. He analyzes seven religions—
Islamic, Bahai, Zoroastrian, Hindu, Sikh, Jewish and Christian—and systematically pulls out
passages that promote violence (Renard, 2012). However, what is noticeably missing from the
literature is an equivalent work that similarly highlights passages from sacred texts that promote
peace. This may be due to the difficulty of deploying sacred texts in peacebuilding. Textual
analysis of religious myths shows that efforts to build peace in the context of religion will meet
their strongest resistance from conservative interpretations and expressions. Peace building
through religion requires conscious and deliberate efforts to emphasize peaceful passages in
sacred texts and credible interpretive documents. The general approach in the literature, as
exemplified by Marc Gopin’s (2012) book Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring
Peace to the Middle East, is to leave the interpretation of the holy texts up to the local religious
leaders. Gopin (2002) takes a look at the similarities and differences between the three
Abrahamic faiths (Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) and delves somewhat into the hermeneutic
differences (that is, alternative ways of interpreting the sacred) between Islamic, Christian, and
Jewish beliefs. Much of what he writes, however, is not transferable to other religious conflicts,
such as the one between the Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils.
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The issue of legitimacy of religious intervenors is another theme that emerges from
scholarship related to religion in peacebuilding. When the efficacy of state institutions breaks
down in the face of violent conflict, religious entities often remain as the sole legitimate actors to
broker peace agreements and negotiations. Religious organizations establish credibility by
working with people in the long-term at the grassroots level, and often emerge as the most
effective initiators in transforming conflict. There is disagreement, however, about whether a
religious actor is most effective in this regard when being seen as apolitical and impartial
(Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997; Wehr & Lederach, 1991).
Religious groups, active in most settings through works of charity and social projects,
often emerge in situations of violent conflict as the most legitimate actors as government
institutions break down or fail to deliver services or protect civilians. This idea of religious
institutions retaining more legitimacy during times of state breakdown is bolstered by examples
of Muslim religious leaders playing a role in peacebuilding in case studies from the Balkans and
the Great Lakes region (Abu-Nimer, 2008).
To summarize, while much has been written about religion’s role in conflict, a relatively
young and growing body of research shows that religion can play a vital role in peacebuilding.
When wielded by respected religious leaders, passages from sacred texts can provide powerful
motivation for peace or for conflict. Finding ways to amplify certain voices and delegitimize
others can be key to managing a religious conflict.

The Role of Diaspora Populations
This section will discuss some of the ways in which populations that are geographically
separated from a conflict can still influence it. It will refer to a number of examples of these
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dynamics that have occurred globally, and explain their relevance to the conflict in which I will
test the Co-Religionist Hypothesis – Daesh in Syria and Iraq.
Diaspora populations often play a role in conflict, whether to build peace or to wreck it. I
will use the term “diaspora” for purposes of this dissertation to mean groups of people who feel a
connection, whether real or imagined, to a people group and/or conflict that is removed from
them geographically. I make this definition purposely broad so that it includes co-religionists,
but does not limit our lens to consider only co-sectarians. For instance, for this dissertation the
term “diaspora” will include groups of Jews in the United States who identify with the state of
Israel, but also it will include Evangelicals in the United States who identify with Coptic
Christians in Egypt. Even though American Evangelicals and Egyptian Coptic Christians come
from very different branches of Christianity, the fact that Evangelicals in some instances feel and
express solidarity with Copts makes them, for purposes of this dissertation, a meaningful
diaspora.
A graphic example of how a United States citizen who is a co-religionist, but not a cosectarian with the group of he considered himself a diaspora member was able to spark violence
across an entire region is provided in the case of Terry Jones, the Evangelical minister from
Florida. Jones, decrying Islam as an inherently violent religion that is persecuting Christians
around the globe, in 2012 publicly burned Qurans as an inflammatory protest. Although he
staged his demonstration in Florida, violence broke out across the Middle East in response
(Peralta, 2013).
The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) lists several examples of diaspora
communities working in just the opposite way: to facilitate the process of bringing conflicting
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parties down a road toward peace and/or social justice (citation of USIP website). In the context
of the Israel-Palestine conflict, many diaspora groups – Christian, Jewish, and Muslim – work
with competing agendas that may or may not lend themselves to peace-building. An organization
called Rabbis for Human Rights in Israel-Palestine works to confront the Israeli army in
attempting to halt its human rights abuses against Palestinians. The efforts are made much more
effective by publicizing their cause to diaspora groups outside of Israel-Palestine:
Where religion and ethnicity elide, diaspora networks constitute a further web of
co-religionists with potential to deploy resources to enhance the market spaces in
which religious groups operate for the purposes of peacemaking. The small-scale
actions of Rabbis for Human Rights in Israel–Palestine, for example, are made
much more effective when linked to co-religionists in the US, some of whom are
engaged in inter-faith dialogue to further the peace process (Abu-Nimer, 2004).
The organization makes effective use of web-based campaigns to highlight its work and
to pursue an international campaign for worldwide Jewry to “return to its moral self” (Brewer,
Higgins, & Teeney, 2010).
Diaspora populations matter, particularly when the diaspora resides in a wealthier
country, such as the United States, than the country or region in which the conflicts with which
they identify is geographically located, because this economic disparity provides a diaspora
population with enormous power over a given conflict, whether it be to sponsor or spoil peace
building attempts. As Dr. Hazel Smith (2007) writes for the United Nations University Press,
individuals and groups within a particular diaspora do not form a monolith; they may have
different aspirations and opinions, as well as differing senses of connection to a given conflict:
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Even where a diaspora is more united on objectives, it may play a positive role in
peace-making but also may play a negative role in terms of a contribution to
continued conflict. Whether a diaspora will play either or none of those roles can
best be understood, according to our contributors, by tracing not just the
capacities of the diaspora (agency) but also the transnational opportunities
available to it (structure) (Smith).
When it comes to religious conflicts that involve diasporas, co-religionists can play a
role, either exacerbating the conflict or building inter-faith dialogue, especially when religious
groups within the country successfully solicit support, whether it take the form of financial aid or
propaganda, from co-religionists abroad. In this way, co-religionist diasporas not only can aid the
people affected by a conflict, they can also use their position abroad to transform what had once
been a local or regional issue into a global one. One example of this is that a relatively small
organization known as Rabbis for Human Rights in Israel-Palestine, which is located in the
region, became much more effective in their efforts when they established ties to their coreligionists in the United States (Abu-Nimer, 2004).
The role of diasporas in conflict, particularly their recruitment efforts, is extremely
relevant to an analysis of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, since Daesh both directs its recruiting
efforts outward to international diaspora populations, and also relies in part upon them to
produce and disseminate its recruitment propaganda.
To summarize the last three sections, some literature exists on the role of religion in
peacebuilding, but there are large gaps, as it is a relatively new area of inquiry. Scholars in this
field have established that religion, and religious leaders, can serve as powerful forces to foment
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violence. They also have observed that the same can emerge as powerful forces for peace
building. As we have discussed, this dichotomy stems partially from the so-called “ambivalence”
of sacred texts toward violence, and the fact that religious leaders, if they are seen as legitimate
in their religion, can selectively interpret and preach in either direction (Appleby, 2000).
Religion’s historical integrality to society often lends to it a sense of legitimacy in instances of
conflict, and, likewise, the current and ongoing contributions made by religious leaders in their
local communities can empower them with the legitimacy toward either conflict or coexistence.
This section also took a global perspective on religious conflicts, and the powerful influence
diasporas can wield through material support and through propaganda. This literature review has
sought to summarize and analyze the relevant research on the role of religion in peacebuilding,
and, more specifically, setting the foundation for filling a specific gap: that of testing the CoReligionist Hypothesis.

The Co-Religionist Hypothesis
This section will define the hypothesis I will test, that of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. It also
will define what a “co-religionist” is, why it matters, and explain the significance of testing the
Co-Religionist Hypothesis. It will discuss conventional wisdom surrounding the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis, its implications, the gap in the research, and explain the need to test my research
question.
Conventional wisdom on religious violence argues that the best, or most effective
peaceful intervenors in a religious conflict are co-religionists. A co-religionist is a person who
practices the same religion as one of the parties in the conflict – the more respected as a religious
leader, the better. Many examples abound, both historical and contemporary, of co-religionists
successfully intervening in religious conflicts. It is necessary to point out here that the definition
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of a co-religionist does not require him or her to be peaceful, or to be working toward peace. Coreligionists could just as easily use their perceived religious legitimacy to incite violence.
The Co-Religionist Hypothesis holds that the most effective intervenor in a situation of
religious violence is a person who is a co-religionist of the person or group that is likely to
commit an act of violence. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1998, p.
38) listed several advantages that a religious leader or institution has in dealing with conflict
situations. They have a:
•

Clear message that resonates with their followers;

•

Long-standing and pervasive presence on the ground;

•

Well-developed infrastructure that often includes a sophisticated
communications network connecting local, national, and international offices;

•

Legitimacy for speaking on crisis issues; and

•

Traditional orientation to peace and goodwill

As explained above, the Carnegie report recommends that co-religionists, members of the
same religion, use their positions of authority within their religion to defuse situations that
threaten violence. Co-religionists’ positions of authority give them more power to squelch or
disrupt attempts by other co-religionists who seek to use religious teachings or passages from a
sacred text to promote or justify violence. In doing so, they reinforce the notion among their
congregants that their faith values peace and does not justify or advocate violence (Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998).
Religious fundamentalists put a high value on extensive knowledge of their sacred texts.
This means they will tend to show more deference to what I refer to as a “fundamentalist
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religious leader,” the more authoritative, the better. A religious leader who is seen to have
extensive knowledge of a faith tradition is more likely to be persuasive in convincing extremists
to abandon their extremist views, as compared to one with less credibility (Elliott and Bock,
2017).
The above suggests that co-religionists are better equipped or better positioned to
intervene, peacefully or violently, in religious conflicts. Toward this end, the equipment of a coreligionist, according to the literature, includes a knowledge of theology, an understanding of the
intended audience, and legitimacy within the community. Several peace-seeking organizations,
which are listed previously, have acted on these assumptions to design interventions that
employed co-religionists intervene, whether through dialogue, counterpropaganda, or other
means.
However, there hasn’t been a clear empirical test of these assumptions, and the
implementation of the programs designed based on these assumptions have met with mixed
results. Therefore, given that some practitioners, governments, and scholars are acting on
untested assumptions, my testing of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is necessary. Is it indeed true
that co-religionists are more effective intervenors in religious conflicts? This also raises a
number of related questions. Does it matter if the intervenor is also co-denomination (Sunnis vs.
Shia, or Methodists vs. Catholics)? How does being a co-denominationalist affect the
intervenor’s effectiveness? How does it affect the intervenor’s effectiveness if he or she is a cosectarian (Southern Baptists vs. Baptists, or Wahhabi vs Salafi)? If being a co-denominationalist
or a co-sectarian make one a better intervenor for peacebuilding, does the same peace-wrecking?
The answers to these questions will prove to be useful tools in conflict management.
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Research Question
Conventional wisdom on religious violence argues that religious leaders can serve a powerful
role in either building or wrecking peace. Their perceived legitimacy, coupled with their
authoritative interpretation and preaching of their holy text, would seem to make them at least
tend to be the most effective arbiters of conflict management in a religious conflict. That indeed
is what the Co-Religionist Hypothesis states, and many policy-makers and conflict management
practitioners design their policies and interventions based on that assumption. While this
hypothesis makes intuitive sense, I have been unable to locate a single publication that measures
this hypothesis empirically. While there are some examples of interactions between religious
extremists and their non-extremist co-religionists, very little has been written on what
approaches work best to diffuse an escalation of tensions that can lead to violence. In other
words, when non-violent religious leaders engage in debate with violent co-religionist
extremists, what is the strategy they use? Do they argue the fine points of theology, or do they
advocate for embracing the general thrust of a faith tradition? Conversely, do they make a
secular argument? If the focus is on specific theological views or passages of sacred texts, what
is the process whereby non-extremist religious leaders succeed in bringing their extremist coreligionists through what theologians call a hermeneutic window (where an appreciation for the
variability of interpretation results in seeing religious imperatives differently) (Elliott and Bock,
2017)?

Cautions from the Literature
One pitfall of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, especially those sponsored or
directed by government agencies, must avoid is the “securitization” of Muslim communities.
When CVE programs begin to view Muslim communities primarily through a security lens, it
validates and reinforces Daesh’s narrative of the West being at war with Islam in general, and
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vice versa. In these instances, Muslims become viewed as a suspect community, which
legitimizes discrimination and persecution against them. Terrorists capitalize on the resulting
alienation that comes from this religious profiling to further their recruitment efforts. Particularly
in the case of Daesh, violent propagandists can use this “clash of civilizations” perception to
portray their military and terrorist actions as being defensive, rather than offensive (Aziz, 2017).
Perceived government endorsement of co-religionists also poses an ethical risk for those
designing a CVE intervention, and a real and physical risk for the co-religionists themselves.
Daesh has been known to specifically target for assassination religious leaders it views as
threatening to its world view or collaborating with those who do. Further, followers of these
religious leaders, especially in a religion that is marginalized in the West such as Islam, may also
lose respect for these co-religionist potential intervenors, which therefore minimizes their
effectiveness in counterpropaganda (Aziz, 2017).
A special report from the United States Institute of Peace supports this concern. The
USIP reported that “instrumentalizing religious actors is counterproductive at best, and
dangerous (even potentially life threatening) at worst, given the complex positionality of many
religious leaders in their communities and societies” (Mandaville and Nozell, 2017). The USIP
report uses the term “instrumentalizing” to mean recruiting religious leaders to monitor and
report on suspicious activities within their community. That is not to say that religious leaders
cannot contribute effectively to a CVE initiative:
Religious actors can contribute to CVE, and indeed are important to include and
engage because of their unique positions of authority, the credibility that they
often hold within their respective communities, their ties to their community
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leaders, and their access and knowledge of institutional resources. But this
engagement must be done carefully, respectfully, and inclusively, and include a
recognition that the same approach cannot be effective in every setting
(Mandaville and Nozell, 2017, p. 5).
My research takes a CVE approach, but is not aimed at being antagonistic toward
religious figures, sacred texts, or religion in general. In fact, the point of my research is to create
knowledge that can better inform peaceful, religiously-based interventions.

Alternative explanations for radicalization
This section will propose and analyze other possible drivers of radicalization. Since I am testing
the Co-Religionist Hypothesis in the context of Daesh recruiting propaganda, I need to also
consider whether Daesh considers messaging involving other topics and themes to be more
effective for recruitment purposes. Does Daesh perceive other factors than co-religionists’
messaging to be as influential in the radicalization/de-radicalization process? Possible alternative
propaganda appeals could involve culture, poverty, or resource competition resulting from
climate change and environmental degradation. Certainly, all of these play some role, but how
important does Daesh perceive them to be? It is important to consider these in order to weigh the
significance of the testing the research question, because if I test the Co-Religionist Hypothesis,
and Daesh actually considers themes of poverty to be more effective, it lessens the importance of
the research question. In the sections below I will analyze three potential drivers for
radicalization – Culture, Poverty, and Resource Competition – by taking a look at how much
emphasis Daesh puts on them in Dabiq.
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Culture
How heavily does Daesh rely on cultural messaging to recruit followers to its genocidal cause? Is
there some inherent quality of Islam or Islamic cultures that makes them violent? No, and that
goes to the heart of one of the main points of this dissertation: Neither Islam nor any other
religions are inherently violent. There is no evidence that indicates that majority-Muslim nations
are more violent than non-Muslim majority nations. Incidentally, Dabiq only mentions the term
“culture” 10 times out of a total of nearly 1,000 pages of text.
Further, as will be explained later, as a self-declared “global caliphate,” Daesh uses
universalist messaging as it appeals to the umma, an Arabic term which refers to the idea of a
global community consisting of all Muslims whose common bond is religion. Umma is
specifically distinct from the term shab, which refers to a people whose common bond is
ancestry or geography. Daesh uses Dabiq to send recruiting messages throughout the world,
targeting Muslims in such disparate regions as Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Caribbean. While
certain articles or issues throughout the publishing run of Dabiq certainly target specific regions
and countries for recruitment, any cultural appeals that are specific to the target region are
minimal, if they exist at all. Therefore, I find cultural messaging, as opposed to religious
messaging, for purposes of recruitment propaganda, irrelevant to this dissertation.

Poverty
It has been suggested that researching topics including poverty, as opposed to religious
messaging, might give insight into the Syria and Iraq conflict. It certainly would not hurt – robust
literature finds close links between poverty and conflict (Ikejiaku, 2009). However, this
dissertation specifically focuses on religious messaging in recruitment. Poverty is a topic for
messaging, not a type of messaging.
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And while poverty certainly is a problem in Syria and Iraq, and probably is a driver of
conflict, Dabiq barely mentions it. Poverty is mentioned in nine of 15 issues of Dabiq, and for a
grand total of only 11 times throughout the entire publication run. Poverty obviously is a reality
throughout Iraq and Syria, but it does not necessarily drive people to radicalize to the point of
joining Daesh. Clearly, Daesh does not see it as the most effective topic as a method of
recruitment.
Further, Dabiq was aimed mainly at a global audience, and, while Daesh recruited or
pressed into service many local fighters in Iraq and Syria, by 2015, around 30,000 came from at
least 85 countries to fight in Daesh ranks, many of which were far wealthier than the conflicted
region, according to a report from the National Bureau of Economic Research:
Although the great majority of ISIS recruits come from the Middle East and the
Arab world, there are also many from Western nations, including most memberstates of the European Union, as well as the United States, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and … Russia” (Picker, 2016).
It is not logical to argue that Daesh used poverty in Iraq and Syria as its primary
messaging tool, when thousands of its recruits came from wealthier nations. If poverty were their
strongest motivator, it would seem to make more sense to stay in their own, wealthier countries.
The topic of poverty is almost entirely irrelevant to the research question of this dissertation.

Resource competition
While a body of literature exists that focuses on conflict that is escalating because of climate
change-driven competition for diminishing natural resources, Daesh does not discuss this. The
term “resource” is used only one time in nearly 1,000 pages of Dabiq. “Climate change” is never
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mentioned. I must conclude that Daesh does not consider this issue important enough to discuss.
In any case, climate change affects the entire globe, and only a very small minority of the global
population has joined ranks with Daesh (currently an estimated 35,000-50,000 fighters), so I do
not consider it causal to radicalization to Daesh.

Conclusion
This Review of Literature catalogues the major scholarly work that has been done on the topic of
the role of religion in conflict management. Specifically, I have sought out research that lays the
groundwork for analyzing the efficacy of religious leaders in conflict management.
The Review of Literature discussed the ways in which religion has been linked to
conflict, and how it has proven instrumental in driving many conflicts. It continues to discuss the
“Ambivalence of the Sacred,” or the idea that sacred texts contain portions that advocate
peacebuilding, and also portions that command violence. The next section discusses literature on
how religion can be used in peacebuilding and identifies areas where more research is needed in
order to better inform peacebuilding efforts (Appleby, 2000).
Next, the Literature Review defines the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, which states that coreligionists will tend to be the most effective intervenors in a religious conflict. Linking back to
the literature, this section points out that the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, while commonly
assumed to be true, has never been tested. This logically leads to the Research Question of this
dissertation: Do co-religious intervenors tend to be more effective while acting in a religious
conflict? This is the gap in the research that I aim to fill. In my next chapter, I will lay out the
methodology I will use to test this hypothesis.
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Chapter 3: Methodology

50

Chapter 3 Table of Contents
Proselytization/radicalization as a strategic/incremental endeavor ............................................................. 52
Daesh strategic context ........................................................................................................................... 54
Research Design and Methods .................................................................................................................... 57
Terms Defined ........................................................................................................................................ 58
Creation of Data ...................................................................................................................................... 59
Analysis of Data...................................................................................................................................... 60
Sample and Subjects ............................................................................................................................... 60
Conventional Wisdom Regarding the Co-Religionist Hypothesis.............................................................. 61
Detecting Daesh’s Propaganda Strategies Via Longitudinal Analysis ................................................... 62
Detecting Daesh’s Propaganda Strategies Via Cross-sectional Textual Analysis .................................. 68
A Note on the Co-Fundamentalist Hypothesis ....................................................................................... 69
Expected Results ......................................................................................................................................... 70
Why Does the Validity of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis Matter?............................................................. 70

51

Previously I have written about my introduction to, and subsequent fascination with Daesh
propaganda. As part of my job at The Carter Center, I began analyzing it in all of its facets,
including videos, Twitter missives, and other forms of communication, eventually deciding to
focus on its long-form publication Dabiq.
Dabiq is particularly important to Daesh propaganda because, as the literature states,
appeals to the sacred text are extremely important to religious fundamentalists like Daesh.
Fundamentalists use complex arguments based on their sacred texts to justify their existence,
purpose, methods, and, most important, their claims to be the only true practitioners of their
respective faiths. A small portion of the literature catalogues the violent passages of the sacred
texts of the major world religions, but very little explores the peaceful passages that exist in each
of them. This is where the concept of the “Ambivalence of the Sacred,” or the reality that all
sacred texts contain both peaceful and violent passages, comes into play (Appleby, 2000).
This logically leads to the question: If sacred texts can be used to incite violence, can
they not be used to promote peace? Fundamentalists, who place such an extraordinary value on
the literal (‘literal’ as they perceive it) meaning of their sacred texts might, then, be persuaded to
be peaceful, or even to promote peace themselves through the selective interpretation and
quotation of their sacred texts. Another characteristic of religious fundamentalists, which is more
important for this dissertation, is their respect for and deference to religious authority,
specifically authorities within their own faith.
This led me to my research question, which is referred to throughout this dissertation as
the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, which posits that in a conflict in which religion plays a major
role, the most effective intervenors in the conflict will be co-religionists. The scholars who
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address the Co-Religionist Hypothesis tend to assume it is predictive. However, as I have stated
previously, that has never been measured empirically. This dissertation will strive to do that.
This chapter will explain how.
This chapter lays out the methodology I will use to test the Co-Religionist Hypothesis in
the context of Daesh’s magazine, Dabiq. It first will discuss how proselytization and
radicalization campaigns often take an incremental and strategic approach, and then proceeds to
describe how Dabiq does just this. This will demonstrate that Dabiq’s choice of topics, targets,
sources, and themes are not haphazard, but were chosen strategically, and were published to
fulfill a long-term plan. To do this, I will list several assumptions, with explanations for why I
make them, and proceed to operationalize this test by describing my data, and the methods I use
to analyze it. This will include the software program I use for analysis (NVIVO), the key terms,
and why I use this program and search for these key terms. Then I will analyze the data.
Following this, I will test alternative hypotheses, searching for other key terms, the prevalence of
which might falsify the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. Finally, I will compare and contrast the
results of tests of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis and alternate hypotheses.

Propaganda as an Incremental Strategy
This section will describe Daesh’s strategic and incremental approach to propaganda, using
examples that are not specifically related to the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, but are useful in
demonstrating the degree of thought and planning that Daesh put into its propaganda. Then I will
proceed to draw out aspects of Daesh’s incremental propaganda approach that provide key
insights into the application of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, and which provide opportunities
to test the Hypothesis.

53

As readers and viewers peruse Daesh’s various propaganda efforts, it becomes apparent
that Daesh does not produce propaganda in a haphazard fashion. Rather, Daesh takes a strategic
approach to all of its media forms of propaganda, which it publishes in the form of Youtube
videos, Tweets, Facebook posts, or radio broadcasts. Daesh uses each form of media in different
ways, with different types of messaging, to reach different types of audiences.
For instance, Daesh propagandists tend to make simplistic emotional appeals through its
video offerings, often without any words. On the other end of the spectrum of complexity Daesh
uses its long-form magazine, Dabiq (now known as Rumiyah), to make complex arguments that
often go on for many pages, citing numerous religious scholars, political figures, military leaders
and fighters, and even occasionally, in the case of captured British journalist John Cantlie,
imprisoned hostages Daesh has taken from the battlefield.
Additionally, the approaches Daesh uses depend on a variety of factors, including
territorial losses or gains on the battlefield, political developments on the global or regional
scale, and perceived degree of potential for radicalization in different regions of the world.
Analyzing Daesh’s incremental propaganda strategies is vital to a project that aims to test
the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, because these strategies should reveal the individuals and
institutions that Daesh considers most important, and influential. If the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis is correct, Daesh should prioritize debates with co-religionists over debates with nonco-religionists. Why? Because it would be logical, as will be discussed, for Daesh to attack those
it perceives as its most potent threats both more frequently, and earlier, throughout the
publication run of Dabiq.
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With this in mind, I will discuss and describe how Daesh implements an incremental
proselytization strategy in many, if not all, of its media platforms, making different arguments
and appeals, and stressing different, and evolving, narratives at different times.
Changing the magazine’s focus from Dabiq to Rome (under the new title “Rumiyah”)
illustrates how Daesh strategically designs its propaganda messaging to respond to changes on
the battlefield or elsewhere. When the symbolically significant town of Dabiq fell, Daesh very
transparently shifted the goalposts of its larger mission, a move that, while forced by Daesh’s
enemies, still worked well strategically. Switching from Dabiq to Rome gave Daesh some wiggle
room in its global apocalyptic narrative – not only did it evade the reality that Daesh had not
accomplished its self-styled prophetic goal of making a last heroic stand in Dabiq, it also flipped
the script away from Daesh holding certain territories at all costs. It also moved the narrative in a
more ephemeral, less concrete direction where Daesh could lose territory, yet still claim to be
moving toward its ultimate goal – conquering “Rome,” a goal which could simultaneously be
interpreted in a literal and a figurative sense. The literal conquest of “Rome” would be exhibited
in Daesh’s terrorist attacks in the West, and the figurative conquest would manifest in the form
of continued and evolving attacks on “Rome” in the realm of ideas, rhetoric, propaganda, and
religion-based arguments.

Daesh strategic context
Daesh and its written recruitment efforts provide one of the best possible cases with which to test
the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. A co-religionist intervenor, according to the hypothesis, will be
most effective if he or she is seen as being authoritative and devout within a particular religion.
Daesh’s messaging provides one of the most classic examples of this situation, as analysis shows
that the terrorist organization emphasizes authoritarianism and religiosity to a degree even more
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extreme than Al Qaeda. Once viewed as one of the most extreme, violent, and dangerous terrorist
organizations in the world, Al Qaeda took a back seat to Daesh in this regard once the latter split
from the former. Textual analysis of the organizations’ respective flagship print publications and
platforms for recruitment, Inspire and Dabiq, shows that Daesh’s messaging may be more
effective than Al Qaeda’s in appealing to individuals who place a high value on authoritarianism
and religiosity (Vergani, Bliuc, 2018):
Daesh uses more violence against Muslims than Al Qaeda and commits violent atrocities
against local populations that were merely criticized by senior Al Qaeda members. Therefore, it
is possible that people with personality traits that are highly authoritarian are more likely to be
attracted to Daesh because they are the only group that can meet the psychological needs that are
demanded by providing them with well-constructed justifications of such levels of extreme
violence (p. 4).
I have made Dabiq the focus of my research because it provides the only long-form,
written explanation, description, and justification for Daesh’s identity, world view, purpose, and
claims of legitimacy. As religious fundamentalists who are trying to radicalize and recruit fellow
religious fundamentalists, Daesh needs most of all a long-form publication in which to make its
complex theological arguments. Fundamentalists by nature are very literal people, and thus they
need a literary platform from which to make their arguments. The short-form, interactive
platforms of Facebook and Twitter do not adequately provide for this. And videos are not
literature. Therefore, Dabiq is the obvious choice for analyzing Daesh propagandists’ strategic
prioritization of arguments, and the targets of those arguments. Dabiq provides a long-form
platform for Daesh to express its arguments at any length it chooses, and it also does not allow
for counterarguments to be posted along with it. It enables Daesh to define and defend itself, to
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re-define and attack its targets, and to legitimize itself and de-legitimize all others without
allowing for counter-arguments. However, as we have seen, communication from Dabiq has not
always been one-way.
The death of its chief editor, coupled with the Daesh’s coincidental loss of the city of
Dabiq, which until that point had played a key role in Daesh’s apocalyptic narrative, resulted in a
radical decline in the quality of writing and editing, and perhaps more importantly, the
cohesiveness of its narrative. Besides the overall quality decline, the surviving producers of
Dabiq renamed it Rumiyah, Arabic for “Rome,” scrambling to reinterpret their apocalyptic
narrative in a clumsy attempt at damage control in their recruiting propaganda as major losses on
the battlefield scuttled their aspirations and pretentions of a global caliphate. Thus, the I consider
the 15 issues of Dabiq, first published during Daesh’s infancy and continuing through, and to the
end, of its rise to power, to be the best materials to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
Daesh’s extremist, violent ideology.
Proceeding on from this example of strategic, incremental communication, I will proceed
on to other examples that may seem less abrupt and dramatic, but are actually more pertinent to
purposes of this study.
This dissertation will predict that Daesh propagandists are not irrational actors. It predicts
they are logical, and are acutely aware of their own strengths and weaknesses. This project aims
to allow Daesh propagandists themselves to identify some of those weaknesses.
The Co-Religionist Hypothesis posits that the best intervenors, and in this case, the best
counter-propagandists, will be co-religionists with Daesh’s target audience. In order to affirm or
falsify this hypothesis, I predict that Daesh also is aware of the biggest threats to its attempts to
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foment religion-based violence around the world. I predict that, since intelligence agencies from
the United States and other allied countries were, and are actively hunting down Daesh
propagandists and killing them with drone strikes and other methods, Daesh propagandists would
necessarily attack figures and institutions they feel are the biggest threats to their messaging. I
make this prediction because, as rational actors, Daesh propagandists would know that their days
may be numbered, and that if they do not make their strongest arguments against their biggest
perceived theological opponents early on, they likely will never get the chance.
With this in mind, I predict that Daesh will use its earliest issues of Dabiq to identify and
attack individuals and institutions it considers to be the primary threats to its world view,
theology, legitimacy, and therefore, to its recruitment tactics. Subsequent issues of Dabiq would
attack secondary and tertiary threats. Based on these assumptions, and allowing Daesh to identify
what it considers to be the most potent threats to its efforts, I will further predict that these
individuals and institutions would also serve as the most effective potential intervenors, and
therefore would be the most effective counter-propagandists.

Research Design and Methods
This section will describe the type of research design and methods I will use to test the CoReligionist Hypothesis. I will also describe the materials I will analyze, including details such as
frequency of publication, type of publication, where this publication can be found, and why I
chose this particular publication.
The type of research will be strictly Documents Analysis. Islamic State uses extensive textual
arguments to appeal to its more fundamentalist conservative potential recruits. The magazine,
Dabiq, provides the medium for conveying these textual arguments, and Daesh editors reference
a number of specific scholars, both historic and contemporary, both to bolster their own
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arguments and to attempt to rebut arguments with which they disagree. Arguments Daesh makes
via in-depth textual rationale include: the justification of sex slavery, justification of killing
civilians, women and children, justification for executing prisoners in various gruesome ways,
and justification for establishing their own global caliphate.
For counter-propaganda purposes, it is important to identify the most effective interveners, in
this case, scholars and imams, politicians, civic and business leaders who would most
successfully refute Daesh’s arguments. The co-religionist hypothesis states that the most
effective interveners are those who come from the same faith as those who seem poised to
commit violent acts.
Further, and working from the co-religionist hypothesis, is the co-sect hypothesis: that more
conservative, fundamentalist practitioners will be the most effective interveners when the
potential combatants are also fundamentalist.

Terms Defined
Religious fundamentalism is a key concept for this dissertation. Often laypeople and scholars use
the term “religious fundamentalist” as a generic term referring to someone who practices a
conservative or militant form of religion. This is not necessarily incorrect, but for this
dissertation I use the descriptions given by Scott Appleby and Martin Marty who define it thus:
Fundamentalism, then, differs from traditionalism or orthodoxy or even a mere revivalist
movement. It differs in that it is a movement in conscious, organized opposition to the
disruption of those traditions and orthodoxies. Tradition, orthodoxy, and revival exist
within an ongoing, stable system. Fundamentalism exists in the midst of change (Appleby
& Marty, p. 14).
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The distinction between these terms matters a great deal because fundamentalism stands out
as religious practice in the form of active resistance, rather than as passive, or personal practice.
A fundamentalist’s claims of historicity and theological purity, coupled with his feeling of
grievance toward those he perceives as having perverted or diluted his religion, merges to form
an energetic and aggressive movement that is exemplified by Daesh.
A further theory is that Daesh will seek to attack scholars whose doctrine it considers most
damaging to its narrative, and that Daesh will also cite scholars it sees as being most effective in
bolstering its arguments. My hypothesis is that these will be more conservative and
fundamentalist.
I will also list some terms that Daesh uses in a very particular manner (on which I will
elaborate later) in this section of Terms Defined.
Kufr: unbelief
Nifaq: disbelief
Munafiq: Muslim who secretly harbors disbelief in the religion and attempts to sow similar seeds
of doubt in his or her fellow Muslims.
Riddah: Apostacy
Murtadd: An apostate Muslim
Taghut: A secular, non-religious leader. (However, Daesh conflates this term to include statesanctioned Muslim scholars and imams.)

Creation of Data
With these theories in mind, I will do the following to create data:
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•

Code all 15 issues of Dabiq to categorize scholars, religious leaders, and secular heads of
state that Daesh uses either to bolster its own argument or to attack others’.

•

Use NVIVO software to identify the themes found in Dabiq. Since Dabiq is available
online in .pdf format, looking at Dabiq’s themes issue-by-issue and also over the full 15issue run should not be difficult. My project will seek to connect specific themes or
arguments to specific clusters of textual references.

Analysis of Data
After using the above methods to create my data, I will take the following steps to analyze it:
•

Quantify the number of times Daesh uses intra-faith arguments versus interfaith
arguments (arguments with targeting fellow Muslims versus arguments targeting nonMuslim religious figures).

•

Analyze, over the course of the 15-issue publication, the order in which Daesh references
certain types of scholars, targets for theological debate, theological themes, and specific
textual references, both to the Quran, the Torah, and also the Bible. The implication,
given the fact that the propagandists themselves could die in drone attacks at any time, is
that the earlier the reference occurs in Dabiq, the more important it is to Daesh. If Daesh
attacks a scholar early on, the implication is that Daesh considers that scholar to be more
of a threat to its worldview and theology.

Sample and Subjects
The sample will be all 15 issues of Dabiq magazine. The subjects will be Daesh propagandists
and scholars and leaders identified in issues of Dabiq. I chose these specific issues, first, because
they were the last ones that were published by Daesh’s late chief propagandist, Ahmad
Abousamra, who founded the magazine, and was killed after the 15 issues of Dabiq had been
published (Globe, 2015). Secondly, the quality of the publication declined dramatically after his
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death. The third and final reason for this selection is that the 15 issues of Dabiq show the
progression from scholars and groups that are most like Daesh to those that are least like Daesh,
but who still fall into its list of desired targets for terror and propaganda.
Dabiq is a high-quality, long-form, online print publication that provides the most
thorough explanation for Daesh’s identity, purpose, reason for existence, enemies, allies,
methods both on and off the battlefield, theological justifications for Daesh methods and
philosophy, and how it distinguishes itself from other, similar groups and sects. Dabiq is
available in English and other languages, but the easiest language to find is English.
Dabiq was originally published on the Dark Web, but was made available to researchers
by several different organizations, such as The Clarion Project and Jihadology, neither of which
are sympathetic to Daesh. All issues of Dabiq and its subsequent iteration, Rumiyah, are
available in .pdf form.
The page count of Dabiq increases generally over successive issues, ranging from 50
pages in its first issue to nearly 100 pages toward the last few issues. Various innovations in
publishing sections, such as battlefield updates detailing losses and gains of territory, newlyformed or dissolved alliances with other militant groups, as well as increasingly complex
theological arguments combine to make for an increasingly lengthy publication.

Conventional Wisdom Regarding the Co-Religionist Hypothesis
A number of prominent organizations and scholars implicitly subscribe to the co-religionist
hypothesis, including Abu Nimer, Brewer, Gopin, Hayward, Higgins, Teeney, Rabbis for Human
rights in Israel-Palestine, The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, and The
Carter Center. The US State Department, perhaps surprisingly, given the terrible track record of
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its failed and naive “Think Again, Turn Away” counterpropaganda project against Daesh, has
recently begun to warm up to the idea of recruiting co-religionists to counter violent religious
messaging (rather than implementing without a theory of change, as the Department had
previously tried), according to a USIP report:
The International Religious Freedom Office at the State Department increasingly
has taken a broader and more engaged approach to its mandate, seeing its role as
being not only about monitoring and criticizing violations of religious freedom
abroad, but actively developing religious pluralism and peaceful coexistence
through engagement with and support of peacebuilding by religious actors,
organizations, and communities. Its approach to nurturing environments in which
religious freedom is protected and respected is understood as contributing to
peacebuilding overall (Hayward, 2012).
However, as I have stated previously, while so many practitioners and scholars assume
the predictive nature of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, even if they do not refer to it as such, this
hypothesis has never been measured empirically. Below I will lay out the methodology with
which I will attempt to test the Co-Religionist Hypothesis.

Detecting Daesh’s Propaganda Strategies Via Longitudinal Analysis
This section explains the methodology I use to analyze key elements of Daesh’s incremental
propaganda strategy. The term “incremental propaganda strategy” refers to how propagandists,
in this case Daesh’s, purposely evolve their messaging over time in order to several specific
goals. Previous analysis of other propaganda campaigns shows how they have employed
incremental strategies to achieve specific goals. One glaring example in history of a propaganda
campaign that implemented an incremental strategy and that resulted in some of the most horrific
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atrocities in history is the Nazi Holocaust. Adolf Hitler and his Nazis did not begin their
movement by building extermination camps. They began by using propaganda that initially
played to Germans’ feelings of humiliation and desire for a restoration of national dignity. But
over the course of the decades that culminated in World War II, this propaganda campaign
incrementally helped spur the German people from feeling frustrated and embarrassed as a
nation to eventually murdering millions of people, according to an article by Sara Bloomfield,
Executive Director of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Bloomfield went on to
make specific comparisons between the incrementality of Nazi and Daesh propaganda, most
notably their appeals to a form of nationalistic unity, demonization of “the other,” and promises
to build a utopian state (Bloomfield, 2019).
These goals using an incremental propaganda strategy for recruitment could include any or
all of the following:
-

Evolve over a period of time the thinking processes, attitudes, outlooks, and opinions of
potential recruits who already are engaged with elements of the propaganda campaign.

-

Attract new followers who previously had not been persuaded by earlier arguments or
propaganda efforts.

-

Reflect changing realities on the battleground or political or religious spheres.

-

Specifically, in the case of a terrorist organization such as Daesh, the propagandists
themselves might publish what they consider their strongest, most persuasive materials
earlier on for fear that they themselves might be assassinated before they get the chance
to do so. This could include publishing stronger arguments, targeting leaders or scholars
they consider the bigger threats to their propaganda efforts, highlighting scholars or
leaders they feel best bolster their propaganda efforts, or highlighting sacred texts that
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seem to be the most supportive of their efforts. (This is not hypothetical; as is explained
later, Daesh’s chief propagandist and top editor for Dabiq was indeed assassinated by a
drone strike.)
How, without being able to view communications between Daesh propagandists themselves,
do we go about observing and analyzing their strategies? Is this possible? How do we know they
design and implement long-term, incremental strategies in their propaganda?
The following series of paragraphs illustrate how Daesh’s strategic propaganda evolves over
time. It does not claim to prove that Daesh prioritizes more threatening targets either in a
longitudinal or cross-sectional manner. It does, however, serve as a rare example of how Daesh
changes its messaging over time in a strategic manner. Since we cannot gain access to the
internal editorial discussions about messaging strategy in order to prove that such strategic
messaging changes over time exist or existed, the following is extremely important to note.
An example of Daesh’s strategic propaganda evolving over time, provided in the last section
of this chapter, of the name switch from Dabiq to Rumiyah, works well as an example in this
dissertation because of its obviousness, but its reactiveness makes it less of an apt example when
it comes to the kind of long-term strategic planning that this dissertation seeks to analyze.
One of the most dramatic examples of how Daesh propagandists have changed the form and
content of their messaging over time came when Daesh changed the name of its flagship
magazine, Dabiq, to Rumiyah when coalition forces seized the city of Dabiq. Daesh had given
the name of Dabiq to the magazine because its propagandists had seized upon a passage in the
Quran that seemed to predict in an apocalyptic narrative that the city of Dabiq would become the
stage for a last stand of the true followers of Islam, which Daesh, of course, believes to be its

65

members. Indeed, each issue of Dabiq contains a quote from Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi: “The
spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission –
until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.”
This quotation was replaced in the first issue of Rumiyah with the following: “Oh
muwahhidin, rejoice, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees
of Rumiyah (Rome).”
The city of Dabiq itself held little or no strategic military significance, and the coalition of
forces opposing Daesh saw this as a counterpropaganda opportunity, one they could pursue on
the battlefield. After losing the city of Dabiq in a fierce street-by-street battle, Daesh
immediately changed the name of its magazine to Rumiyah, Arabic for Rome, and reshaped its
prophetic narrative to emphasize the city of Rome as being its primary target. Rome, which
Daesh viewed as being the home of Christianity, and thus connected with The Crusades, became
a shorthand for the Western world.
Changing the magazine’s focus from Dabiq to Rome illustrates how Daesh strategically
designs its propaganda messaging to respond to changes on the battlefield or elsewhere. When
Dabiq fell, Daesh very transparently shifted the goalposts of its larger mission, a move that,
while forced by Daesh’s enemies, still worked well strategically. Switching from Dabiq to Rome
gave Daesh some wiggle room in its global apocalyptic narrative – not only did it evade the
reality that Daesh had not accomplished its self-styled prophetic goal of making a last heroic
stand in Dabiq, it also flipped the script away from Daesh holding certain territories at all costs.
It also moved the narrative in a more ephemeral, less concrete direction where Daesh could lose
territory, yet still claim to be moving toward its ultimate goal – conquering “Rome,” a goal

66

which could simultaneously be interpreted in a literal and a figurative sense. The literal conquest
of “Rome” would be exhibited in Daesh’s terrorist attacks in the West, and the figurative
conquest would manifest in the form of continued and evolving attacks on “Rome” in the realm
of ideas, rhetoric, propaganda, and religion-based arguments.
What does the name switch from Dabiq to Rumiyah have to do with the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis? On the surface it would be appear very little. One reason I include it is that almost
nothing has been made public about internal editorial discussions and decisions among the staff
members who published Dabiq and Rumiyah. When opposition armies intentionally forced the
hand of Daesh’s propaganda arm, the shifting battlefield realities provided us a small window
into its strategic thinking. While we have little or no access into internal Dabiq editorial
planning, with this shift we do get to witness a bit of back-and-forth communication between
them and outside forces. One element that is central to Daesh’s identity, and one that
distinguished it from the terrorist group Al Qaeda, from which Daesh sprung, was Daesh’s
aspirations, and purported ability, first, to hold territory, and secondly, to establish and maintain
an actual state. The goal of establishing and governing a state was predicated on the premise that
Daesh be able to hold territory. Thus, Daesh’s enemies, by seizing Dabiq, achieved possibly the
single most important propaganda coup in the organization’s existence.
Traditional military force, just like terrorism, is a form of communication, and the seizure of
Dabiq presented one form of propaganda against Daesh, and the renaming of Dabiq displayed
Daesh propagandists’ response. Renaming Dabiq to some extent demonstrates the level of logic,
strategy, and evolving messaging over time that goes into producing Daesh propaganda.
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While the renaming of its flagship magazine serves as possibly the most dramatic shift in
Daesh’s propaganda messaging over time, another shift, this one much more deliberate and
incremental, holds much more importance for this dissertation. Changing the name of Dabiq to
Rumiyah was a forced move, and a very public and humiliating one for Daesh. The strategic
changes in messaging that help us analyze who Daesh fears the most as counterpropagandists in
its recruiting efforts – which is the point of this dissertation – have not made headlines like the
loss of Dabiq, but they are not at all hidden.
Conveniently for the purposes of this dissertation, Dabiq writers are very explicit in
identifying three items in each issue of the magazine: 1) the audience they intend to reach, 2) the
individuals, groups and institutions they fear, and thus seek to target for attacks, whether
militarily, through terroristic acts, or with propaganda, and 3) the individuals, groups, and
institutions they feel best legitimize them as an Islamic organization and as aspiring nation-state
(although Daesh does not use that term).
Using longitudinal analysis in this way should prove essential in determining which targets
Daesh considered most worthy of attacking first with its textual arguments. It seems logical that
Daesh, sooner, rather than later, would attempt to discredit scholars, organizations or political
figures it felt most threatened its legitimacy as an Islamic Caliphate. Conversely, it would seem
to make sense that it would save those targets it deemed to be less of a threat until later in the
publication run of Dabiq/Rumiyah. Another way to analyze Dabiq in search of the same answers,
however, would be to determine the overall frequency with which Daesh targeted certain
scholars, organizations, or political figures, over the entire publication run of Dabiq in a crosssectional analysis. This portion of my methodology is what I will discuss in the next section.

68

Detecting Daesh’s Propaganda Strategies Via Cross-sectional Textual Analysis
This section will lay out the cross-sectional portion of my methodology, which will code and
analyze the entire publication run of Dabiq for the frequency with which Daesh uses the
magazine to target certain scholars, organizations, or politicians, and also what types of scholars,
organizations, or politicians it targets, and how frequently. Rather than focusing on which targets
Daesh attacks earlier, rather than later, this portion of analysis will take a broader view and
analyze which targets Daesh considers its biggest threats based on how frequently Daesh targets
them over the entire publication run of Dabiq. If Dabiq targets certain individuals, groups, or
organizations, or if it targets certain types of individuals, groups, or organizations more
frequently in total over the several years of Dabiq’s publication, I will make the prediction that
Daesh considers those to be more threatening to its worldview.
If the Co-Religionist Hypothesis (CRH) is correct, Daesh will debate and attack coreligionists who oppose violent interpretations of the Quran and the application of such more
frequently and more vociferously than it will debate and attack individuals, organizations, and
governments that profess religions other than Islam, or are secular in nature. Therefore, the
frequency with which Daesh denounces Muslim scholars and religious leaders in Dabiq should
exceed the frequency with which it denounces scholars and religious leaders who are not coreligionists.
Likewise, if the CRH is correct, in order to bolster and support its own arguments and
legitimacy, Daesh also will rely upon and cite scholars and religious leaders who are coreligionists more frequently than it cites scholars and religious leaders who are not coreligionists. Therefore, the frequency with which Daesh cites Muslim scholars and religious
leaders in Dabiq should exceed the frequency with which it cites scholars and religious leaders
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who are not co-religionists. In other words, if Daesh co-religionists are disproportionately
important to fundamentalist, religious propagandists, they will both attack them more when they
disagree with them and cite them more when they agree.

A Note on the Co-Fundamentalist Hypothesis
A hypothesis that is closely related to the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is the Co-Fundamentalist
Hypothesis. The Co-Fundamentalist Hypothesis predicts that, in a conflict in which a
fundamentalist version of a religion plays a major role, the most effective intervenors – whether
peaceful or violent – will be leaders of the same fundamentalist religious sect. My review of the
literature did not find this hypothesis, so to my knowledge, this hypothesis is a novel
contribution from this dissertation.
Similarly, and further, if the co-fundamentalist hypothesis is correct, Daesh will tend to
debate and attack other fundamentalist groups within Islam that challenge either Daesh’s
legitimacy, its message, or its use of violence, the forms that violence takes, or the targets of that
violence. Since fundamentalist scholars and religious leaders in Islam, as in any major world
religion, form a tiny minority as compared to non-fundamentalist scholars and religious leaders,
the test of the frequency with which Daesh cites one group versus the other may not be
applicable. It may be that a better test for the co-fundamentalist hypothesis would focus on how
early in Dabiq’s publication run Daesh cites one group versus the other, since I am making the
assumption that Daesh will tend to make its most important and persuasive arguments earlier,
rather than later. But in any case I will test this with both longitudinal and cross-sectional
analysis.
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Expected Results
This section will explain what I expect to find when I conduct both longitudinal and crosssectional tests. It will also explain the relevance of these results to peace-building and conflict
management, and they matter. First, I will discuss the implications of whether the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis is supported by the evidence.
If the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is predictive, Daesh will tend to cite and attack
individuals or organizations that profess the same religion as Daesh, in this case, Islam. It will
attack its co-religionists earlier, more frequently, and more vociferously than it attacks other
targets. Therefore, if this is the case, Daesh will target its fellow Muslims earlier, more
frequently, and more vociferously than it attacks figures that are secular, or are of other faiths,
such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, etc. Conversely, and for the same reasons,
Daesh should also tend to cite its co-religionists earlier, more frequently, and more vociferously
than it cites individuals or institutions that profess other religions than Daesh – so in this case,
anything other than Islam. This dynamic could also hold true for specific sects within Islam.
If a co-sect or co-fundamentalist sub-hypothesis also holds true, Daesh would rely most
heavily upon conservative, fundamentalist scholars to bolster its arguments, because this would
be a logical extension and refinement of the co-religionist hypothesis. This makes sense, because
Daesh itself has stated repeatedly that it aims to rebuild an Islamic caliphate, based on
(purportedly) literalist interpretations on highly-selective passages of the Quran. Preliminary
analysis suggests this true.

Why Does the Validity of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis Matter?
More interesting, however, to the field of peacebuilding are the scholars and textual arguments
that Daesh argues against. I hypothesize that the scholars Daesh finds most threatening to its
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world view are not those who are most different from Daesh, but those that are most similar.
This might seem counterintuitive, but a similar trend has already been borne out on the
battlefield. Although many in the United States believe that Daesh primarily targets Christians,
in fact the vast majority of those Daesh has killed have been Muslim, and not just Muslim, but
specifically Sunni Muslims who interpret or practice Islam differently than Daesh. This parallel
matters, because Daesh representatives have stated repeatedly that they consider the fight for
eyes, ears, hearts, and minds in the realm of propaganda and social media to be just as important
to their struggle as the physical battlefield.
For peacebuilding in this context, then, the most important question is: who are the most
effective interveners? I aim to allow Daesh propagandists themselves to identify these people, by
cataloguing their identities, affiliations, and position on the spectrum of liberal/fundamentalist of
those whom Daesh tries to discredit.
It is reasonable to predict that Daesh, by attacking them first, most frequently, and most
vociferously, will help us identify the potentially most-effective interveners among the ranks of
conservative, fundamentalist, Sunni Muslims who have established legitimacy and authority
through scholarship and powers of persuasion. As the next chapter shows, preliminary research
and coding supports this.
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Chapter 4: Background and Preliminary Analysis on Daesh and its
Propaganda
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This dissertation seeks to identify, or at least describe, the most effective types of intervenors in
conflicts in which religion plays a major role. I pursue this by testing the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis, which posits that the most effective intervenors in a religious conflict will be of the
same religion as the belligerents. I have reviewed the pertinent literature on this topic, key
concepts of which include the ambivalence of sacred texts toward violence, the history and
characteristics of religious fundamentalists, characteristics of religious aggression, the
domestication of violent religious imagery, and the religious embrace of the paradoxical. The
major gaps I identified include the lack of research done on religion as a tool for peacebuilding,
and the fact that the Co-Religionist Hypothesis has never been tested empirically. Chapter three
describes the methodology I use to test this hypothesis. Put simply, I take a successful
propaganda campaign employed by a major terror organization, Daesh, and analyze Daesh’s own
propaganda to identify the types of intervenors that threaten Daesh the most. It is logical to
predict those intervenors would be the most effective at countering Daesh’s propaganda efforts.
In this chapter, I explain the context and the media in which I test the Co-Religionist Hypothesis:
Daesh propaganda – specifically, its flagship magazine, Dabiq. I begin by describing the conflict
that helped spawn Daesh.
Two linked conflicts, one in Iraq, and one in Syria, have together killed hundreds of
thousands and displaced tens of millions of people. The power vacuum created by the United
States’ invasion of Iraq gave room for Daesh to establish itself as the most infamous and brutal
militant Islamist group in the world. Daesh, originally an offshoot of Al-Qaeda that rapidly
distinguished itself with its brutal executions and tortures, its declared intent to seize and
maintain control over territory, and its unprecedented sophistication in online recruitment
propaganda. Western experts have found themselves at a loss as to how to counter Daesh’s
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recruitment efforts and its ability to inspire acts of terror around the globe. The United States
State Department launched a counterpropaganda campaign, Think Again, Turn Away, that
attempted to dissuade potential recruits by sharing propaganda and information critical of Daesh,
but it failed miserably (Katz, 2014). Online, public arguments between Daesh and State
Department would-be anti-propagandists quickly turned into media coups for Daesh. Time and
again, Daesh demolished Western expectations, both on the ground militarily, and in the world
of online propaganda (Katz, 2014). While Daesh has lost 99 percent of its territorial holdings in
the face of relentless opposition, the terrorist organization managed to control huge swathes of
Iraq and Syria for several years, and as many as 31,500 Daesh fighters still occupy parts of the
two countries, most notably in strongholds in the Hajin area of Syria (Callimachi, 2018).
The success of Daesh’s complex, nuanced, multi-platform, multi-narrative propaganda
campaign challenges conflict researchers and practitioners. How does one counter this? One way
to do this is listen to what Daesh is saying. The West too often gets lost and overwhelmed by the
car bombs, heavy death tolls, and gruesome videotaped murders. Conflict researchers must not
forget that beneath all the brutality and graphic violence, some serious thinkers, scholars and
propagandists are publishing well-considered messaging that resonates with a surprising number
of people around the globe in extremely successful efforts to recruit them to Daesh’s cause.
In this chapter I discuss Daesh’s origins, both as Daesh describes them in its propaganda
and as historians explain them objectively. This becomes necessary because the narrative Daesh
tells differs distinctly from what historians and objective observers report. Then I give an
overview of Daesh’s propaganda, giving a special emphasis to its flagship magazine, Dabiq. The
section on Dabiq includes brief descriptions of major themes that appear throughout various
issues of the magazine. I begin by giving an objective, historical description of Daesh.
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Objective history of Daesh
Daesh came into being, not as the result of any single incident, nor by the machinations of any
single person, but as the product of the confluence of factors. Similarly, Daesh’s ideology and
theology cannot be traced to a single individual or school of thought. I will start with an
overview of the circumstances that lead to Daesh coming to prominence in the Middle East, both
in political terms and as a military force.
Daesh forced its way to global prominence in 2014 when it captured Mosul and parts of
western Iraq. The jihadi force declared itself as the “Islamic State” in July, 2014, in the first issue
of Dabiq. A series of high-profile publicized executions of aid workers and journalists, followed
closely by videotaped executions of captured civilians and opposition fighters, rocketed Daesh to
a dubious sort of rock star status among militant Islamic groups. Prominent Muslim clerics
roundly denounced Daesh’s barbaric violence as being un-Islamic, but the group’s notoriety,
furthered by its aggressive propaganda campaign, provided a steady stream of fighters who
traveled from around the world to fight for Daesh in Syria and Iraq (Picker, 2016).
The destabilization created by the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government enabled
Daesh’s creation, but regional power vacuums in the past did not necessarily lead to
radicalization movements as extreme as Daesh’s. Additionally, there is evidence that the
groundwork for the creation of Daesh was laid well before the United States invaded Iraq. While
the Jordanian jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is credited as the founding leader of Daesh, it was
really the Zarqawi’s number two man, Abu Ali al-Anbari, who provided the intellectual
underpinnings of the organization (Hassan, 2018).
Anbari and Zarqawi put forth a form of Islam that did not allow for “gradation,” or the
idea that certain deviations within or offenses against Islam were considered lesser
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transgressions, and that as such might warrant some sort of punishment, but not outright
excommunication (known as “takfir”). Gradation is a common concept, accepted throughout
most sects of Islam, and Daesh’s rejection of it became one of the key factors that made the
group stand out from its jihadi brethren (Hassan, 2018).
The rejection of gradation became especially important when Zarqawi and Osama bin
Laden argued, rather publicly, over the question of whether it was necessary or desirable to
slaughter Shia. Zarqawi argued that any deviation from the Sunni version of Islam was
tantamount to polytheism, including the circumambulation of shrines practiced by Shia and other
variations practiced by Sufis (Dabiq, Issue 13). (Oddly absent from Daesh’s condemnations is
the circumambulation of the Kaaba, known as “tawaf,” part of the hajj pilgrimage in Mecca.)
Daesh takes the position that any and all deviations from its version of Islam are equally
abominable. Daesh subscribes to a form of Salafism, a school of thought within Islam that is
characterized by adherence to the customs and practices of the time of Mohammad, not just the
theological teachings of the Quran. More specifically, Daesh subscribes to Wahhabism, a
movement begun within Salafism by Muhhamad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, that seeks to eradicate any
practices and customs that were not done during the time of Mohammad. Wahhab broke with his
fellow Sunnis by taking a hard line against any individual or tradition that he interpreted as
acting as an intermediary, or intercessor between Muslims and Allah. Wahhab and his followers
condemn the veneration of saints, graves, or shrines. This puts them at odds not only with many
of their fellow Sunnis, but with Shia and Suffis as well.

Daesh version
Daesh, like all religious fundamentalist groups, claims that it, and it alone, practices its religion
in the only authentic manner that is consistent with how the religion was originally conceived by
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its original prophets. Daesh claims that all political innovations introduced to the Muslim world
since the time of the Prophet Mohammad are incompatible with true Islam (Wood, 2015).
Thus, Daesh explicitly denounces nationalism and the separation of church and state as
being un-Islamic. On the pages of Dabiq, Daesh derides Muslim religious leaders who accept
secular governance as voluntarily accepting a sort of prison – i.e., allowing a secular government
to put Islam into a box from which it cannot enforce the rule of the Quran. Daesh rejects most
contemporary conceptions of Islam, ridiculing them as “treating the Quran as a book of chanting
and recitation rather than a book of governance, legislation and enforcement” (Dabiq Issue 1, p.
24). Daesh claims that establishing theocratic, Muslim rule reestablishes the precedent set by the
Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham), and is the only legitimate, authentically Islamic form of government
(Dabiq Issue 1, p. 24).
Daesh claims that its legitimacy stems from two sources: its ability to control territory
and the purported purity with which it practices Islam:
And upon them is to understand that The Islamic State – on account of what Allah
has blessed it with of victory, consolidation and establishing the religion – is
regarded as an unquestionable imamah. As such, anyone who rebels against its
authority inside its territory is considered a renegade, and it is permissible to fight
him after establishing the hujjah against him (i.e. clarifying his error to him with
proof). (Dabiq Issue 1, p. 27)
While Daesh claims to reject the idea of nationalism, it is unclear how exactly its
emerging “Islamic State” would differ fundamentally from the structure of other theocratic
nations. What Daesh specifically seems to reject is not nationalism itself, but rather the national
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borders that emerged as a result of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement that established spheres of
influence in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region between British and French
colonizers. Daesh also seems to reject ethno-nationalism, although it does not use that particular
term, when it states that the territories it seized in Iraq and Syria would become the so-called
“Islamic State” that would become the new home for all Muslims, regardless of race or current
nationality. It would become the home of a global, Muslim caliphate, and this aspiration of
global supremacy would come in large part as Muslims began to embrace Daesh’s hardline
version of Islam.
Like many other religious fundamentalist groups, Daesh claims that returning to the
historically authentic manner of practice of its religion will re-establish a long-lost supremacy.
Daesh claims, of course, that its definitions and interpretations of Islam are the only pure, true,
authentic version. More so than other sects of Islam, Daesh subscribes to and relies heavily upon
the Hadith, which describe the manner in which society operated during the time of the Prophet
Mohammad. Other sects of Islam treat the Hadith as descriptive, rather than prescriptive, but
Daesh operates as though they hold the same level of authority as the Quran (Boutz, 2015). In
reality, Daesh cherry-picks passages from all three in order to suit its needs, using them
selectively to justify a range of atrocities, from systematic sex slavery to gruesome manners of
executions (Mandhai, 2014).
Indeed, Daesh, according to Daesh, is the only group that practices Islam in the way that
Allah commanded to the Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) that it be practiced:
… We can see that The Islamic State is the entity that most emulates the millah of
Ibrahim with regards to imamah in the areas where it exists. It has carried out the
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command of Allah – as much as it can – in the best possible manner. It
established the religion in the areas where it exists and continues to pursue this
effort vigorously. All this, after Allah had granted the imam of The Islamic State
the blessing of performing hijrah and fighting jihad in His cause, on top of already
having been characterized by his noble lineage, sound intellect, and a prestigious
level of knowledge and religious practice. (Dabiq Issue 1, p. 27)
However, objective historians and most mainstream scholars of Islam reject Daesh’s
extremely sectarian version of the religion. Indeed, Daesh can claim the endorsement of almost
no respected scholars of Islam (Boutz, 2015). I will discuss Daesh’s aspirations in the next
section.

Daesh’s Aspirations for a Global Caliphate
Again, like many religious fundamentalists, Daesh explicitly rejects the idea of a separation
between mosque and state. One of Daesh’s favorite scholars, Sayyid Qutub, developed radical
Islamist philosophies that sought to subvert all trappings of the secular state, including
government, politics and economics, beneath Islamic law. Appleby in Ambivalence of the Sacred
characterizes Qutub’s manifesto as bearing “all the elements of the fundamentalist ideological
pattern: the alarm over the perceived loss of religious integrity, the refusal to compromise with
outsiders, the sense of the apocalyptic crisis, the envy and imitation of secular modernity
juxtaposed with revulsion at its immoral excesses, and finally the desire to build a
comprehensive religious alternative to secularism” (p. 93). Appleby goes on to quote Qutub, who
uses the word “jahili” to mean secular modernity (although the term originally referred to a “time
of ignorance before the rise of Islam):
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We must also free ourselves from the clutches of jahili society, jahili concepts,
jahili traditions and jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the
practices of jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it … Our foremost objective is to
change the practices of this society. Our aim is to change the jahili system at its
very roots – this system which is fundamentally at variance with Islam and which,
with help of force and oppression, is keeping us from the sort of life which is
demanded by our Creator (Appleby, p. 93).
Daesh, like Al Qaeda, subscribes to Qutub’s rejection of secular modernity, including the
secular state. Daesh’s aspiration to hold and control significant amounts of territory, expressed
literally on its pages of propaganda and physically on the battleground distinguishes it from its
predecessor, Al Qaeda, both in theory and in practice. Another major ideological difference that
separates Al Qaeda from Daesh is “takfirism,” which broadly refers to what degree of
sectarianism the respective groups subscribe. I describe this difference in the following section.

Takfirism and the Break with Al Qaeda
Daesh took sectarianism to a degree beyond what even Al Qaeda preached and practiced. As
noted above, Zarqawi and bin Laden disagreed on targeting Shia mosques for terror attacks.
Zarqawi favored it, as he saw all Shia as being deviants from true Islam, while bin Laden favored
a more inclusive vision that eventually might have seen Shia and Sunni team up against the
West.
Daesh also differed from Al Qaeda in that it focused most of its violence and its
theological arguments upon local targets, rather than on the West. While Al Qaeda entertained
global aspirations in the sense that it carried out successful and spectacular terror attacks on
prominent Western targets, Daesh focused its intense focus regionally, with the ultimate goal of

82

establishing an Islamic society on seized territory in which it could create a safe haven for
Muslims from all over the globe to travel to and make their home. Both Al Qaeda and Daesh
wished to antagonize the West, but Daesh aspired to go further and establish an Islamic state. A
likely explanation for this difference lies in the fact that Al Qaeda’s stated purpose for the Twin
Towers terror attacks was to force the United States to withdraw its troops from Saudi Arabia,
which, being the home of Mecca, could already be considered an “Islamic state.” Daesh, despite
its talk of a global caliphate, focused most of its military efforts regionally in Iraq and Syria, and
sought/seeks to establish an Islamic State ruled, not by royalty as is the case in Saudi Arabia, but
by Muslim theocrats (Byman, 2015).
While Al Qaeda focused outwardly, both in its argumentation and the targets for its terror
attacks, Daesh developed an intense, burning focus inward, both geographically and
theologically. Daesh considered those who deviated from its extremely narrow view of Islam as
posing a far greater threat to Islam than Western forces who might oppose Muslim forces on the
battlefield, but whose ideology and theology (or lack thereof) was so dissimilar to Daesh’s that it
was largely irrelevant (Byman, 2015).
More so than Al Qaeda – indeed, more so than any other group that has come to such
global, or even regional prominence -- Daesh staked its claims of legitimacy upon the supposed
purity and historic authenticity with which it practiced and preached Islam.

Dabiq, the Magazine
Dabiq is a high-quality, long-form, online print publication that provides the most thorough
explanation for Daesh’s identity, purpose, reason for existence, enemies, allies, methods both on
and off the battlefield, theological justifications for Daesh methods and philosophy, and how it
distinguishes itself from other, similar groups and sects. Dabiq is available in English and other
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languages, but the easiest language to find is English. Dabiq propagandists tailor their messaging
for an international audience, mostly, but not always Western. While the bulk of its propaganda
targets Europe and the United States, certain articles focus recruiting efforts on geographic
targets that were at times surprising, including Russia and Trinidad and Tobago. The name of the
magazine, Dabiq, comes from a passage in the Quran that seems to predict that the last true
believers of Islam will make an apocalyptic final stand in the city. The city of Dabiq itself holds
no particular military strategic value, but Daesh chose to seize the city purely for propaganda
purposes. Somewhat humorously, in a dark sense, coalition forces realized this and forcibly took
the city, prompting Daesh propagandists to change the name of the magazine to Rumiyah, Arabic
for Rome, and to re-work their apocalyptic narrative somewhat to accommodate for the fact that
they were, in fact, unable to hold onto any particular bit of territory indefinitely.
Dabiq was originally published on the Dark Web but was made available to researchers
by several different organizations, such as The Clarion Project and Jihadology, neither of which
are sympathetic to Daesh. All issues of Dabiq and its subsequent iteration, Rumiyah, are
available in .pdf form.
The page count of Dabiq increases generally over successive issues, ranging from around
40 pages in its first issue to nearly 100 pages toward the last few issues. Various innovations in
publishing sections, such as battlefield updates detailing losses and gains of territory, newlyformed or dissolved alliances with other militant groups, as well as increasingly complex
theological arguments combine to make for an increasingly lengthy publication.

Structure
Daesh published 15 issues of Dabiq over the course of around two years, with the first issue
coming out July 5, 2014, and the final issue published July 31, 2016. Daesh published issues of
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Dabiq according to the lunar calendar, in keeping with Islamic holidays. After the final issue of
Dabiq, Daesh changed the name of the magazine to Rumiyah, Arabic for Rome.
The sample I use is the 15 issues of Dabiq magazine. The subjects are the Daesh
propagandists and scholars identified in issues of Dabiq. I chose these specific issues, first,
because they were some of the last ones published by Daesh’s late Chief Propagandist, Ahmad
Abousamra, A.K.A. Sheikh Abu Sulayman ash Shami, who founded the magazine. Ahmad
Abousamra was killed in a drone strike several months after the 15th issue of Dabiq had been
published. Secondly, the quality of the publication declined dramatically after his death, and after
coalition forces seized the city of Dabiq, forcing propagandists to rename the magazine Rumiyah.
The third and final reason for this selection is that the 15 issues of Dabiq show the progression
from scholars and groups that are most like Daesh to those that are least like Daesh, but who still
fall into its list of desired targets for terror and propaganda.

Content
Daesh propagandists used Dabiq as a vehicle to publish a range of topics and types of media.
The first issues were devoted almost entirely to theological argumentation that attempted to
establish Daesh’s theological legitimacy. Dabiq’s length and complexity increased over time,
and its propagandists developed new themes with subsequent issues.

Themes
Daesh strikes a wide variety of themes in its propaganda in an iterative and evolving fashion.
Most if not all themes that are presented in the first few issues continue appearing to some
degree throughout the remaining publication run of Dabiq, but Daesh goes on in later issues to
introduce additional themes. Typically, these newer themes do not replace original themes, but
rather get packaged alongside more articles that repeat Dabiq’s original themes, so that the
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magazine gains length and complexity generally, issue-by-issue. In this section I list most of the
main themes Daesh propagandists strike on the pages of Dabiq.
Legitimacy of Daesh
Daesh propagandists quote extensively from the Hadith and Quran in attempting to establish
itself as the only true practitioners of Islam. However, Dabiq editors and writers quote very
selectively from these sacred texts, opportunistically using only those passages that seem to
support Daesh’s tactics, its legitimacy, and its strategies.
Delegitimization of other groups
Daesh in Dabiq seeks to delegitimize any groups or sects that do not interpret and practice Islam
in exactly the same manner as Daesh. The extreme degree to which Daesh takes sectarianism
makes it stand out from other jihadi groups, even more so than the notorious Al Qaeda. Like Al
Qaeda and other similar militant Islamic groups, Daesh takes as a given the infidelity of nonMuslim groups or sects such as Hindus or Christians.
However, Daesh takes this much further than other jihadi groups. Daesh split with Al Qaeda over
the issue of whether to bomb Shia shrines and mosques (Daesh favored it, while Al Qaeda
disapproved, arguing that Shia and Sunni might be able to work together against the West). But
even this was not enough for Daesh. Daesh declared war also on Sunni muftis and scholars who
operated peacefully within the structure of secular nation states. Efforts to delegitimize any and
all other groups outside of Daesh form a recurrent theme throughout the entire publication run of
Dabiq.
Demonization of the West
Daesh seeks to depict a Samuel Huntington-esque world in which “The West” and “Crusaders”
pose an existential threat to true Islam, which of course is defined extremely narrowly by Daesh
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propagandists. While the term “Crusader” obviously has religious overtones, Daesh frequently
uses it more generally to refer to any forces, institutions, or individuals coming from the West.
Daesh, like so many other jihadi groups before it, uses a normative approach to international
relations, attempting to turn an Islam vs The West narrative from prescriptive to descriptive by
using sporadic terror attacks in Europe to goad Western forces to take increasingly more
interventionist tactics. The point of this antagonism is to redefine Daesh’s military actions from
being a regional power grab to being a global fight for the soul and land of Islam.
Fighter Recruitment vs Citizen Recruitment
Daesh propagandists make different types of recruiting appeals to attract people with different
skill sets, goals, and motivations. Dabiq writers seek throughout the entire publication run of the
magazine to recruit fighters to come to the region and help Daesh seize and maintain control of
territory. The rapid, ongoing death toll ensures that the demand for fighters will persist as long as
Daesh is in existence.
But, looking toward a future it envisions in which Daesh might maintain a sustainable
state, Dabiq propagandists also make more specific recruitment appeals to the skilled
technicians, doctors, educators, lawyers, and, especially, Muslim clerics and scholars Daesh
would need to manage such a state.
Anyone who is moderately familiar with the military situation in Syria and Iraq could
reasonably predict that moving to the region and joining ranks with Daesh in any fashion would
require them to serve as fighters at some point, even if their particular skill sets made them more
valuable in other capacities. But Daesh specifically recruits such skilled individuals, devoting a
significant amount of editorial space to these efforts especially earlier in the publication run of
Dabiq as Daesh declared its “caliphate.”
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Justification for brutal execution methods and other brutal tactics
Daesh uses specific, often obscure, passages from the Hadith to justify and establish Islamic
precedent for the unusual and brutal methods it uses to execute prisoners. Even the execution of
prisoners in general is debated in the Muslim world, but Daesh goes further to use sacred
passages to attempt to justify specific execution methods, such as beheading captives and, most
notably, burning the downed Jordanian pilot to death.
The role of women in Daesh
Dabiq features a string of articles aimed specifically at recruiting women, and also at defining
the role women should play in society according to Daesh’s extremely skewed and selective
interpretation of Islam’s sacred texts.
The articles aimed at recruiting women depict the emerging caliphate as a safe and secure
Islamic utopia, ideal for raising Muslim families under the teachings and law of Daesh’s idea of
the one, true faith. In these articles Dabiq writers claim Daesh has the ability to provide security,
the rule of law, infrastructure, and other institutions and services upon which any society
depends for its survival.
However, readers will note a stark contrast in the articles Daesh uses to justify and
promote its abuse and enslavement of women in territories it conquers and controls. Daesh
quotes selectively from its sacred texts to justify sex slavery it systematically imposed upon
women, especially those who came from non-Muslim groups, such as the Yazidi. The reality that
emerged from these textual distortions was that enslaved women were forced to have sex, on the
strength of “temporary marriages,” with many men each day, and were forced to take birth
control in order to continue to serve in their role as sex slaves.
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Cubs of the Kilafa
Toward the end of the publication run of Dabiq, which took place as Daesh lost more and more
territory to alliance forces, Daesh started a new genre of videos, accompanied by corresponding
articles in Dabiq, that introduced a new theme: that of preparing the next generation of Daesh
fighters, not only to continue the conflict, but to establish and maintain a proto-state for Daesh’s
“caliphate.”
Some of the articles and videos used peaceful imaging that promoted the idea of
cultivating the next generation of Daesh society, such as one video where a young teen appears
to be leading a mosque full of older men in the call to prayer (directly reminiscent of the account
in the Christian Gospel of Luke, chapter 2, where Jesus leads discussions of theology among
elder scholars).
However, many other articles, still images, and videos in the vein of “The Cubs of the
Caliphate” theme took a much darker turn. Dabiq editors did a great deal of cross-platform
promotion for this genre of articles and photos, highlighting in Dabiq propaganda they had
produced using other media. Multiple still images and articles in Dabiq referenced or depicted
gruesome videos in which fathers were shown encouraging and forcing their young children to
execute bound, unarmed prisoners. For example, one such cross-platform bit of propaganda that
appeared in Dabiq provided still photos of a young boy, perhaps four years old, shooting an adult
male in the head who had been tied to a decrepit ride in an abandoned amusement park.

How released/disseminated
Issues of Dabiq were released monthly according to the lunar calendar through Al Hayat, the
media wing that handles publication of much of Daesh’s propaganda. These issues were
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published online as .pdf files. It is unclear if printing them in hardcopy form was ever done to
any great extent.

Daesh and Scholarship
Daesh issued a request for Quranic scholars in its very first issue of Dabiq, alongside its
advertisement for sympathetic engineers, medical doctors and lawyers. It is telling that Daesh
propagandists prioritized this request for scholars by putting it in the first Dabiq issue at the same
time it was actively searching for people with the experience and background to form a
functioning society.
The fact is that Daesh, for all its bluster about it embodying the one, true version of
Islam, has very few respected Muslim scholars who endorse it, or that it can even cite to support
its interpretation or practice of Islam. Even Al Qaeda, as extreme as its ideology is, has a reliable
stable of scholars it can cite to support its actions.
Daesh does not enjoy such luxury. Daesh is a Salafist movement. Salafism is a movement
that claims and/or aspires to recreate the customs and laws of the times of the Prophet
Mohammad. More narrowly, Daesh subscribes to Wahhabism, which has been defined by a
writer for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as:
… the intellectual legacy of the thirteenth-century Islamic scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn
Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, as interpreted and enforced
by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his successors. Marked by extreme traditionalism and
literalism, Wahhabism rejects scholastic concepts like maqasid (the spirit of
sharia law), a principle that many other Islamic schools uphold; kalam (Islamic
philosophy); Sufism (Islamic spirituality); ilal (the study of religious intentions in
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the Quran and hadith, sayings attributed to the Prophet); and al-majaz (metaphors)
(Hassan, 2018).
Daesh’s paucity of supporting scholars or scholarly writings is a direct product of its
extreme version of sectarianism. It only stands to reason that as you define your religion so
narrowly, and in such violent and rigid terms, that increasingly you will find yourself standing in
a very tiny circle that includes very few intellectuals or scholars to support your ideology. On the
other hand, taking such an extremist stance has helped it in its recruitment efforts. While creating
an appealing recruitment campaign for a violent religious fundamentalist movement requires a
certain amount of brainwork and knowledge of the religion being used as the vehicle for said
violence, being susceptible to such a campaign clearly does not. The fact that multiple Europeans
were arrested while traveling to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh carrying books bearing the titles of
“Islam for Dummies” and “Quran for Dummies” attests to this (Henneghan, 2014)
Daesh, like all religious fundamentalists, claims it does not interpret its sacred text, but
quotes it responsibly and applies it in the most straightforward, obvious way possible. And, as in
the case of all religious fundamentalists, this claim is false. In fact, religious fundamentalists are
the most ideologically-driven interpreters of sacred texts. They happily reinterpret or
recontextualize their sacred texts in order to recruit followers and modify their behavior:
To gain support beyond small cadres of followers, fundamentalist leaders must
persuade ordinary believers to suspend existing teachings that condemn violence
and promote peacemaking. Believers who are theologically informed and
spiritually well-formed tend not to be susceptible to such arguments.
Unfortunately, ordinary believers are not always sufficiently grounded in the
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teachings and practices of their traditions to counter fundamentalists’ selective
reading of sacred texts. Thus religious extremists tend to prey upon the young and
untutored (Appleby & Marty, 2009).
Daesh’s claims of legitimacy, and their direct links to Islam’s sacred texts, and the
necessity of quoting these texts at length to make these claims of legitimacy informed my
decision to focus on Dabiq to analyze its propaganda strategies.

Conclusion
This chapter has given an overview of Daesh and its propaganda. In it I describe Daesh from its
own perspective, and how Daesh attempts to establish legitimacy. Following this I give an
account of how Daesh is perceived, critiqued, criticized and denounced by most mainstream,
respected scholars of Islam, and also how Daesh’s origins are described by objective historians.
More specific for the purposes of this dissertation, I explain how Daesh’s search for
legitimacy, its recruitment efforts, and justification for its various atrocities play out on the pages
of its chief vehicle of propaganda, the magazine Dabiq. I describe the various themes struck by
Daesh propagandists, and how they evolve over time to suit the evolving needs of the
organization as its fortunes rose and fell on the battlefield, and as its aspirations for the creation
of an Islamic utopia first began to materialize, and then as they quickly began to fade away.
Next, I continue in analyzing Daesh propaganda, and how I use it to find answers to my
research question, which tests the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. As I have mentioned elsewhere,
the Co-Religionist Hypothesis predicts that in a conflict in which religion plays a major role, the
most effective intervenors, whether peaceful or violent, will be those who are of the same
religion as the potential belligerents.
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Chapter 5: Analysis
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This chapter describes the specific processes with which I test the Co-Religionist Hypothesis and
proceeds to analyze the data I extracted from Dabiq. Leading up to this chapter I have reviewed
in Chapter 2 the relevant literature pertaining to the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, Islamic State,
religious fundamentalism, and propaganda, and laid out, also in Chapter 2, the gaps in the
literature and the research questions that logically follow in order to test the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis. I then described in Chapter 3 the methodology I use to test the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis. I then described in Chapter 4 the context, materials, and authors I examine to test the
hypothesis, which are, respectively, the conflict in Syria and Iraq, the magazine Dabiq, and
Daesh propagandists.
Here I give a brief overview of these points, and describe how each logically follows into
the other, and finally transition into my specific methods, and then go on to analysis. I begin with
the literature.
The literature shows that religion can and has been used as a tool both for peace and for
war, but more literature focuses on the latter than on the former. The concept of the ambivalence
of the sacred means that no religion is completely inherently peaceful or violent (Appleby,
2000). Thus, respected religious leaders can use their respective religious texts to either promote
peace or incite violence. The literature further indicates that religious fundamentalists are more
susceptible to this type of influence, as they place an extraordinary amount of emphasis both on
the exact wording of their sacred texts, and upon the authority of respected religious leaders who
interpret them.
For those who wish to identify the most effective messaging, and the most effective
messengers with which to either incite violence or promote peace, the Co-Religionist Hypothesis
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logically becomes extremely important. The Co-Religionist Hypothesis posits that the most
effective messengers will be respected religious leaders who are of the same faith as the people
they seek to influence. The conventional wisdom is that the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is
predictive.
However, the place where I seek to fill the gap in the literature is that the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis has not, in fact, been measured empirically. Under the umbrella of this hypothesis, if
a conflict is driven in large part by religion, a number of sub-questions logically follow when
determining the general efficacy of particular types of leaders. 1) Are secular leaders more, or
less, influential than religious leaders, regardless of religion? 2) If secular leaders are excluded
from analysis, are Co-Religionist leaders more influential than religious leaders who are not CoReligionist? 3) Are arguments that target Co-Religionists, i.e., “intra-faith arguments,” more
influential than arguments that target non-Co-Religionists, either secular or religious, i.e., “interfaith arguments”?
In this chapter I seek to answer each of these questions with a series of tests. The tests I
use tend to build upon one another. In other words, when I see that a test answers some
questions, but leaves others unanswered, I devise another test, or a series of tests in order to fill
in the gaps. The next section describes these tests, and the questions they seek to answer, and is
followed by an analysis section that discusses the implications of these tests.

Specific Methods for Testing the Co-Religionist Hypothesis
The tests I conduct to determine the predictivity of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis all use the
NVIVO textual analysis software to seek to determine through analyzing term frequency and
usage what individuals, institutions, and religions makes Daesh feel most threatened. I will
organize this section as a series of queries, where I will first define what it is that I am seeking to
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discover, then describe how I aim to discover it, and follow it with a graph that illustrates my
findings. As I encounter limitations, I describe and explain them in a separate Limitations
section. Then I analyze the resulting graph and discuss what those findings could mean. First, I
outline my methodology for determining what religion figures most prominently in Daesh’s
arguments, and by extension, seems to pose the biggest threats and potential support to and for
its worldview and legitimacy. The following describes the cross-sectional tests.

Cross-Sectional Tests
In this section, I analyze all issues of Dabiq as a whole, as though its 15 issues were all
combined into one volume. I do this by putting all Dabiq issues into NVIVO and doing various
word searches to quantify how frequently Dabiq refers to certain figures, or institutions, or
makes certain types of arguments. This enables me to look at Daesh propagandists’ overall
priorities during the entire publication run of the magazine. I divide these tests into two
categories, determining whether Daesh feels more threatened by religious or secular entities, and
the other category determining whether Daesh feels more threatened by Co-Religionist or nonCo-Religionist religious entities. These tests seek to answer research questions 1 and 2, as
previewed in the introduction to this chapter.

Upon Which Major World Religions Does Daesh Focus the Most?
Ruling out secular figures and institutions for a moment, it would be helpful to know which
religions concern Daesh the most. This is important, because the conventional wisdom in the
United States is that Daesh considers its main enemies and targets to be Christians and Jews –
not its fellow Muslims. The National Association of Evangelicals argues in an article on its
website that Daesh’s primary objective is to wipe out Christianity entirely:
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The Islamic State’s attack on Christianity is neither coincidental nor tertiary, nor
does it represent a part of ISIS’ plan. It is at the very heart of their plan.
… In every major address or written communication given by the founder of the
Islamic State, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, he has declared their intention to arch “all
the way to Rome,” and along the way, he has promised to “break the crosses” of
the Christians and to “trade and sell their women.”

So far, Baghdadi has done exactly what he said he would do, and every single
encounter ISIS has had with Christian communities anywhere in the world has
resulted in one of four outcomes: forced conversion, slavery, extortion or
execution. There is not a single exception (2015).

And United States President Donald Trump, in defending his attempt to ban refugees
from Muslim-majority countries, claimed that, out of all existing groups, Christians suffered
more at the hands of Daesh:
BRODY: "Persecuted Christians, we've talked about this, the refugees overseas.
The refugee program, or the refugee changes you're looking to make. As it relates
to persecuted Christians, do you see them as kind of a priority here?"

TRUMP: "Yes."

BRODY: "You do?"

TRUMP: "They've been horribly treated. Do you know if you were a Christian in
Syria it was impossible, at least very tough to get into the United States? If you
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were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost
impossible and the reason that was so unfair, everybody was persecuted in all
fairness, but they were chopping off the heads of everybody but more so the
Christians. And I thought it was very, very unfair.” (NPR, 2017).
But is it actually true that Daesh persecutes, executes, and commits acts of genocide
against non-Muslim groups, such as Christians, more so than Muslims, their co-religionists? Or
does Daesh concern itself more with attacking, whether physically or in writing, fellow
Muslims? If Daesh considers Jews or Christians to be its primary threats or priorities to fight or
debate, it stands to reason that the terms “Jew” and “Christian,” along with related terms such as
“Jewish,” “Christianity,” etc., are mentioned in Dabiq more frequently in earlier issues than
those related to Daesh’s own religion, Islam.
To find out, I created an Excel spreadsheet that lists the frequency with which Dabiq uses
certain terms, beginning with religious designations, such as “Buddhist,” “Christian,” “Jew,”
“Muslim,” and so on, including all existing variations of each term. Queries to NVIVO have
determined the frequency of each over the entire publication run of Dabiq, and also the
frequency of each term per issue of the magazine. I ran the query in NVIVO, and then manually
entered the numbers to a single Excel spreadsheet.
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Total References to World Religions
Across All Issues of Dabiq

Buddhism

Christianity

Hinduism

Islam

Judaism

7, <1%
23, 1%
249, 13%
233, 12%

1,464, 74%
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Search terms: “Buddha,” “Buddhism,” “Buddhist,” “Christ,” “Christian,” “Christianity,”
“Hindu,” “Hinduism,” “Islam,” “Islamic,” “Islamist,” “Muslim,” “Jew,” “Jewish,”
“Judaism,” and all variations of each term.
The following refers to the chart above. For this analysis I have entered the total number
of mentions of the variations of the terms “Buddhism,” “Christianity,” “Hinduism,” “Islam,” and
“Judaism” across the entire publication run of Dabiq. This means that I have searched for all
variations of each term in addition to the term itself; in other words, when searching for
“Christian,” I also searched for “Christianity” and “Christians.” Similarly, when I searched for
“Islam,” I also searched for variations of this term, such as “Muslim,” “Islamic,” and so forth. I
have read through the entire text of the 15 issues of Dabiq multiple times, and, as I have done so,
paid attention to different variations of these terms in order to catch all of them with my queries.
Dabiq writers and editors make reference to Islam nearly 1,500 times, while referencing
Christianity just shy of 250 times, and Judaism a little more than 230 times. No other world
religions were mentioned frequently enough to be significant.
From this initial chart it becomes clear that writing about Islam and fellow Muslims,
whether in a positive or negative way, preoccupied Dabiq editors more than did any other
religion. When I add together the total number of references of Judaism and Christianity, they
still comprise only 25 percent of the total number of religious references. References to Islam
make up the vast majority, or 75 percent, of the total number of religious references. Buddhism
and Hinduism each were only mentioned 7 times throughout the entire publication run of Dabiq,
meaning neither rose to even 1 percent of the total mentions of any world religions.
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This chart represents a first step of looking at the data and illustrates an important point:
whether rebutting or citing, attacking or making appeals, Daesh considers arguments made
within the framework of Islam to be more compelling and more likely to entice recruits than
arguments addressing other religions. Even this initial step challenges the conventional wisdom.
If Daesh really feared or hated Christianity or Judaism so much relative to other religions, why
do its propagandists focus the vast majority of their argumentation on targets which are their
fellow Muslims? For a broader, more sweeping perspective, consider the minuscule amount of
text that is devoted to Buddhists or Hindus – the only other world religions mentioned by Daesh
propagandists. Out of nearly 1,000 pages of Dabiq, Buddhism only rates a mere 7 mentions – not
even 1 percent of total mentions of world religions. Hinduism only gets mentioned 23 times,
barely crossing the 1 percent threshold. I will make the point here (and elaborate on it later in my
analysis) that the two religions that Daesh targets most, after Islam, are both what Daesh refers to
as “People of the Book,” or religions of Abrahamic tradition. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism all
are religions of Abrahamic tradition, thus sharing many elements of faith and tradition that are
not shared with Buddhism or Hinduism.
Based on the literature I reviewed in Chapter 2, I predict that if Daesh mentions a certain
religion or sect more frequently throughout Dabiq, then it sees that religion or sect as more
threatening to its worldview. The Co-Religionist Hypothesis predicts that Daesh’s theological
arguments would be more preoccupied with figures within Islam than with arguing with scholars
of other faiths. The fact that when Daesh mentions certain religions it refers to Islam much more
frequently than any other religion demonstrates that Daesh preoccupies itself much more heavily
with Islam than it does with other religions. The literature on religious fundamentalists claims
(without empirical proof) that, when it comes to recruiting and establishing legitimacy, religious
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fundamentalist groups like Daesh would consider arguments with their co-religionists to be much
more important than arguments about the legitimacy of other religions. However, this does not
address the question of whether Daesh sees religious arguments, individuals, or institutions as
being more threatening than those that are secular in nature. I will address that question in the
following section.

Religious or Secular: Which Actors and Arguments Does Daesh Consider More
Threatening?
This section analyzes whether Daesh preoccupies itself more with arguments against secular
figures, or against religious ones. The purpose of this analysis, again, is to determine in part
whether the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is predictive. If it is predictive, Daesh will tend to rely
more heavily on arguments with and against Muslims, rather than on arguments dealing with
secular figures.
I do this by looking at the frequency with which Daesh specifically denounces or cites
secular leaders or institutions as opposed to leaders or institutions that are at least nominally
Muslim, but that Daesh considers to be at odds with Daesh’s particular practice or interpretation
of Islam.
A peculiarity of Daesh’s style of communication in Dabiq helps facilitate this type of
analysis. Daesh chooses not to fully translate certain terms from Arabic to English, even though
the vast majority of Dabiq’s text is in English. Rather, Daesh chooses to transliterate certain
terms from Arabic script so that an English speaker can sound them out, and always provides its
own definition for these terms. A large portion of these terms refer to apostacy, hypocrisy or
other forms of what Daesh considers to be “deviations” from what it considers “true Islam,”
which of course refers to the highly-specific manner in which Daesh itself practices and
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interprets Islam. I will note that Daesh, for whatever reason, still uses the English word “deviant”
and variations of it instead of transliterating the Arabic term. I am uncertain as to what the
reasoning was for these choices.
The following is an extremely important window into the thought process and one of the
key strategies of Daesh propagandists in the writing of Dabiq. The fact that Daesh propagandists
purposefully do not rely on standard definitions of certain key terms, but choose to use their own
definitions, coupled with the fact that all of these terms go to the heart of Daesh’s arguments for
its own legitimacy, strongly indicates that Daesh propagandists are purposely obfuscating key
concepts as they attempt to appeal to an English-speaking audience. Every time Dabiq writers
introduce one of these terms that they do not fully translate into English, they give their own
definition for it, and then proceed to continue transliterating, but not translating, the term
throughout the entire publication run of Dabiq. Given the fact that 99 percent of Dabiq is written
in English, it is extremely telling to note the type of terms Daesh propagandists choose to
transliterate, rather than translate. Most of them, with a few exceptions, such as the term
“taghut,” – which Daesh uses to mean a secular leader, and, as will be explained later, is not
really an exception at all – are terms that I will later define as relating to “intra-faith” arguments,
as opposed to “inter-faith” arguments. This becomes important to testing the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis, as, later in this chapter, I use these transliterated terms to quantify how frequently
Daesh propagandists choose to argue with Co-Religionists to establish their own legitimacy. For
example, as I have written in Chapter 3, Daesh stands out from all other militant Islamic groups
for its extreme version of takfirism, or the practice/idea of declaring those who deviate from their
particular interpretation of Islam to be kufir, or unbelievers. In other words, (literally) Daesh
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propagandists transliterate, rather than translate, Arabic terms that refer to infidels, perversion or
deviation of the faith, because they literally cannot use the standard definitions of the terms.
I will list below the particular terms to be quantified and compared, along with the
definitions that Daesh gives for them in Dabiq.
Safawi (Daesh does not explicitly give its own definition for this term, but uses it as a derogatory
term for Shia Muslims.):
This was most evident in Iraq as the lions of the Islamic State chased the filthy
Safawis out of numerous towns and cities, forcing them to flee all the way to
Baghdad in spite of their numbers, and the billions spent on them by the crusaders
on weapons and training (Dabiq Issue 1, p. 48).

Kufr:
Amirul-Mu’minin said: “O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been
divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp
of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of
the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews, the
crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr,
all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the jews” (Dabiq
Issue 1, p. 10).
Kāfir vs. Murtaddīn vs. Kuffār Asliyyīn:
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Contemporary scholars differ over the ruling on kāfir sects existing for multiple
generations and ascribing themselves to Islam as to whether they are murtaddīn or
kuffār asliyyīn. Some later scholars consider them to be kuffār asliyyīn. The first
famous scholar to hold this view was as-San’ānī. However, earlier scholars such
as Ibn Taymiyyah consider these sects to be murtaddīn. Likewise, this is the
official stance of the Islamic State as declared by Shaykh Abū ‘Umar al-Baghdādī
(rahimahullāh) in his audio statement “Qul Innī ‘Alā Bayyinah Min Rabbī.” The
ruling of apostasy on the Rāfidah does not mean they had ever been Muslims but
rather, that they are dealt with much more severely, as they must either enter into
Islam or face the sword, as opposed to being treated like kuffār asliyyīn who can
sometimes be allowed to remain upon their kufr in certain circumstances (treaties,
slavery, etc.). The differences in the way that the two are dealt with can be found
in the books of fiqh. (Dabiq Issue 6, p. 31)
Munafiq/Nifaq:
Al-Hasan al-Basrī (rahimahullāh) said, “No one fears hypocrisy except a believer,
and no one feels safe from it except a hypocrite” [Jāmi’ al-‘Ulūm wal-Hikam].
Ibn Rajab (rahimahullāh) said, “Sahl at-Tustarī said, ‘The murīd (devout
worshipper) fears being afflicted with sins, but the ‘ārif (knowledgeable slave)
fears being afflicted with kufr.’ For this reason the Sahābah and the righteous
Salaf after them were afraid of nifāq (hypocrisy) for themselves, and their worry
of nifāq was severe. Therefore, the believer is afraid of minor nifāq for himself,
and he is afraid that such could overcome him prior to death and thus drive him
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into major nifāq, as we mentioned before that deeply hidden evils bring about
sinful death” [Jāmi’ al-‘Ulūm wal-Hikam] (Dabiq Issue 3, p. 26).
Murtadd:
The person who calls himself a “Muslim,” but who unapologetically commits
blatant kufr is not a munafiq (hypocrite), as some mistakenly claim. Rather he is a
murtadd (apostate). The difference between nifaq (hypocrisy) and riddah is that a
munafiq conceals his kufr and openly manifests Islam, quickly apologizing if ever
his cover is blown. The murtad, on the other hand openly commits his kufr after
ascribing to Islam (Dabiq Issue 14, p. 8).
Rāfidah:
Ibn Saba’s fitnah ultimately led to the forming of the sect known as the Rāfidah,
who would carry a modified form of his da’wah. The sect, like all deviant sects,
would evolve over time, innovating more and more heresies, kufr, and
wickedness.
As for the name “Rāfidah,” then it comes from the word “rafada” meaning to
reject. They were named so when they came to Zayd Ibn ‘Alī Ibn al-Husayn Ibn
‘Alī Ibn Abī Tālib s (died 122AH) and asked him to declare barā’ah from Abū
Bakr and ‘Umar

in exchange for their support. He refused to do so and instead

said, “May Allah have mercy upon them both.” So they told him, “We then reject
you.” Henceforth, they were called “the rejecters.” The scholars also called them
so because the Rāfidah rejected the imāmah of Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthmān,
because they rejected the Sahābah, because they rejected the Sunnah, and because

108

they essentially rejected the Qur’ān and the religion of Islam. (Dabiq Issue 13 p.
34)
Taghut/Tawaghit:
This, in reality, was a result of secularism pervading the people’s intellects in our
era, separating between religion and state, and between the Shari’ah and
governance, and treating the Qur’an as a book of chanting and recitation rather
than a book of governance, legislation, and enforcement. This environment had an
effect on the du’at (callers to Allah), who began continually reassuring the people
that the sincere ones amongst them had absolutely no aspirations towards
positions of rule and authority. It was as if being a dai’yah (caller to Allah)
subjugated in the prison of a taghut (tyrant ruling by manmade law) was a role to
be satisfied with, as long as one was making takfir of the taghut and takfir of
those fighting for the cause of taghut. This subjugated da’iyah would begin to
favor this role over living freely in the shade of a Muslim imam, calling others to
him, and helping to consolidate his position (Dabiq Issue 1, p. 24).
For those who wish to replicate my research methods, you will probably note that using
NVIVO to analyze Dabiq in particular can be a tricky process. Initially I ran into a problem, in
that NVIVO’s ability to catch each instance of certain terms in Dabiq seemed really spotty,
particularly when it came to searching for the terms that Daesh transliterated from Arabic to
English pronunciation. For instance, an NVIVO search of the term “nifaq,” it turned up only one
hit, in Issue 1, when the term actually occurs multiple times in multiple issues.
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The explanation is two-fold: 1) NVIVO is not quite sophisticated enough a program to
pick up on certain symbols, for instance the long vowel diacritic. What Daesh writes in Dabiq to
mean “hypocrisy” is specifically “nifāq.” The symbol signifying the diacritic for the long “a”
sound threw NVIVO off. Copying and pasting the term directly from the magazine on The
Clarion Project online enables NVIVO to find the term and tabulate its frequency.
I searched almost all terms on the second most restrictive setting for matches, which is
“with stemmed words.” With one, however, I used the next more expansive setting, which
includes synonyms, for the word “deviant,” because Daesh uses this term in different forms
throughout Dabiq: “deviant,” “deviancy,” “deviate,” for example. The reason why Daesh
chooses to use the term “deviant” in English, rather than a transliteration from Arabic is unclear
to me. I do not attach any particular significance to this other than that it was an arbitrary choice
by Daesh propagandists.
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Search terms: “Christian,” “Christianity,” “deviant,” “deviancy,” “deviate,” “Muslim,”
“Islam,” “Muslim,” “Jew,” “Judaism,” “riddah,” “rafida,” “murtaddīn,” “murtad,” “nifaq,”
“munafiq,” “kufar,” “kufr,” “taghut,” “tawahghit,” and all variations of these terms.
The above chart illustrates the frequency with which Daesh makes arguments that target
or cite entities that are, respectively, Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or Secular, in addition to more
specific mentions of intra-Islamic targets, respectively, “hypocrites,” apostates, “rejectors,” and
“unbelievers.” This breakdown is significant because it addresses the Co-Religionist Hypothesis
in a different way. Rather than identifying the messengers Daesh prioritizes, it looks at the
messages Daesh prioritizes. If Daesh makes arguments using terms that apply only to actions
taken by those Daesh considers to be deviants within Islam – even if Daesh considers these
deviations to be so great that they no longer are Muslim – I label those types of arguments as
being “intra-faith” arguments. If Daesh makes arguments using accusations of conduct that could
only be done by those who were never Muslim, I label those types of arguments as “inter-faith”
or “secular” arguments.
When I lump together arguments dealing with the two main non-Islamic faiths that
concern Daesh, namely, Christianity and Judaism, they comprise a mere 13 percent of the total
arguments made. All other arguments are concerned with intra-Muslim issues, i.e., apostacy,
deviancy, and disobedience to Islamic tenets as interpreted by Daesh.
Now, it is important to note that even though Christianity and Judaism together only
comprised 13 percent of the total religious arguments, they still represented the only other
religions that Daesh bothered forming arguments against. As I have mentioned before, the fact
that Daesh argues only with faiths of Abrahamic Traditions, and barely mentions other religions,
fits with my Concentric Rings Observation (explained below) – Dabiq propagandists prioritize
arguments with groups that are more similar, rather than less similar to them. The manner in
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which Daesh references the only other two religions it bothers mentioning, Buddhism and
Hinduism, illustrates this as well, and shows a stark contrast to how it addresses those of
Abrahamic Traditions:
Dabiq writers mention Buddhism a mere seven times in nearly 1,000 pages of text, and
never once do they bother trying to argue or attack Buddhist philosophy or theology, as they do
with Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Rather, Dabiq writers refer to Buddhism once in passing
as they give a brief summary of the history of Islamic militancy, in Issue 6 (page 41) and simply
state, without commentary, that the Taliban had destroyed the giant Buddha statues in
Afghanistan. Buddhists are mentioned once in passing, in Issue 12 (page 43) in a list of other
religions that Daesh considers “kufar,” or unbelievers. The other five times Dabiq writers
mention Buddhists appear in Issue 14 (pps. 8, 60, 62, and 64) and all have to do with the
Buddhist-majority government’s oppression of Muslims in Myanmar. The importance of these
observations to this dissertation is that in none of these references to Buddhism do Dabiq writers
attempt to use any theological arguments against Buddhists, or really, any arguments of any sort,
other than to say that they are unbelievers and, as such, are part of a general, much bigger
phenomenon of a global persecution of Islam. Buddhists are never singled out as being an
existential threat to Islam in the same way as so-called “deviants” within Islam, and, to a much
lesser extent, Christians and Jews.
The manner in which Dabiq propagandists treat Hinduism is strikingly similar. “Hindus,”
or variations of the term, are mentioned only 23 times, or 1 percent of the total mentions of any
religions in Dabiq, and when they are mentioned, as in the case of Buddhists, it is only to say
they are “unbelievers,” (Issue 12, p. 43), or to list them as targets of assassination or as invaders
(Issue 14, p. 22). In other words, Dabiq propagandists do not bother to engage with Buddhists or
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Hindus in the realm of theological arguments or propaganda. These targets are only seen as
“targets” in the military or terroristic context, and even then, in a very limited one, perhaps due
to the fact that so few Buddhists or Hindus live in the immediate territories Daesh occupies(d) –
Syria and Iraq.
The fact that Dabiq propagandists never attempt to engage with Buddhists or Hindus in
the context of propaganda and/or theological argumentation supports the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis, since neither Buddhism and Hinduism are considered part of Islam, and do not share
the Abrahamic Traditions that Christianity and Judaism do.
Sikhism was mentioned only one time (Issue 12, p. 43) in a laundry list of other world
religions. I address the significance of this on page 126 of this chapter.
Now that I have demonstrated that Daesh preoccupies itself far more with “intra-faith”
arguments (that is, arguments with Co-Religionists) more than it does with “inter-faith”
arguments (that is, arguments with religious figures who are not Co-Religionists) it logically
follows that I ask another sub-question. How do we compare and contrast Daesh’s perception of
threat as coming from secular leaders versus religious leaders? How do we identify every secular
leader named by Daesh, short of doing word searches for every single head of state that Daesh
might have mentioned?
It turns out that one of the idiosyncrasies of Dabiq’s messaging makes this test possible.
One of the many terms that Daesh transliterates from Arabic, but does not actually translate, is
“taghut.” Daesh defines the term as being “a tyrant ruling by manmade law” in its first issue on
page 24:
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From amongst the aspects of this great millah that have begun to fade
from within the souls of many people and be viewed as nothing more than
fantasy, is the notion that the Muslim Ummah [nation] should strive to be
united behind a single imam (leader), fighting under his banner and
empowering him to guard the landmarks of this religion and implement
the Shari’ah [law] of Allah. This, in reality, was a result of secularism
pervading the people’s intellects in our era, separating between religion
and state, and between the Shari’ah and governance, and treating the
Qur’an as a book of chanting and recitation rather than a book of
governance, legislation, and enforcement. This environment had an effect
on the du’at (callers to Allah), who began continually reassuring the
people that the sincere ones amongst them had absolutely no aspirations
towards positions of rule and authority. It was as if being a dai’yah (caller
to Allah) subjugated in the prison of a taghut (tyrant ruling by manmade
law) was a role to be satisfied with, as long as one was making takfir of
the taghut and takfir of those fighting for the cause of taghut. This
subjugated da’iyah would begin to favor this role over living freely in the
shade of a Muslim imam, calling others to him, and helping to consolidate
his position. These du’at couldn’t grasp the idea that Islam could have a
state and an imam, nor could they begin to understand what it would cost
to achieve this. It was as if they’d never studied the history of Islam and
learned what this endeavor would require of us in terms of blood.
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The pie chart below illustrates the emphasis Dabiq writers place on Intra-Religious
arguments versus Inter-Religious arguments. I use the term “Intra-Religious arguments” to
encompass a specific genre of arguments targeting what for our purposes would be considered
Co-Religionists, because they would all be considered Muslim by most other groups besides
Daesh. This genre of arguments uses concepts such as “apostate,” “hypocrite,” “rejector,” and
“unbeliever.” The transliterated Arabic terms Dabiq uses for these concepts are respectively,
“ridda,” “nifaq,” “rafid,” and “kufr.” All of these arguments to varying extents focus on what
Daesh considers to be perversions, or deviations from Daesh’s idea of the One True Faith, as
opposed to outside groups, whether they be secular, or of other religious traditions, such as
Judaism or Christianity.
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Threats From Within Vs Threats From Without
(Aggregated)
Non-Islamic Religious Arguments
Islamic Arguments
Secular Arguments

13%

13%

74%
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Search terms: “Christian,” “Christianity,” “deviant,” “deviancy,” “deviate,” “Muslim,”
“Islam,” “Muslim,” “Jew,” “Judaism,” “riddah,” “rafida,” “murtaddīn,” “murtad,” “nifaq,”
“munafiq,” “kufar,” “kufr,” “taghut,” “tawahghit,” and all variations of these terms.
The above chart illustrates the frequency with which Daesh makes arguments with and
against Muslim sources and targets, as opposed to the frequency with which Daesh makes
arguments with and against non-Muslim targets and also against Secular entities. The vast
majority, or around three-quarters, of Daesh’s arguments pertain to Islam and various sects and
interpretations of this particular religion.
Each of the cross-sectional tests makes it clear that Daesh spends much more time and
space arguing against their fellow Muslims than against individuals, groups or organizations that
are either secular or are of a religion other than Islam. This indicates that Daesh views fellow
Muslims as posing a much more potent threat to its propaganda efforts than do other actors who
are not of the same faith. This supports the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. I will now turn to
longitudinal tests, which analyze Dabiq’s targets over its entire publication run.

Longitudinal Tests
I use longitudinal tests to analyze how Daesh uses a strategic, incremental propaganda plan to
attack certain targets at different times and in different ways over time. Again, I am using these
to test the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. If the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is predictive, it is logical
that Dabiq editors will use their propaganda to attack co-religionist targets earlier in the
publication run of the magazine. Similarly, if the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is predictive, it is
logical to predict that, if Dabiq editors wait until further in the publication run of the magazine to
attack certain targets, they do not consider those targets to present as great, or as important a
threat as targets they attack earlier. On the other hand, if Dabiq editors choose targets that are not
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Co-Religionist earlier than those that are Co-Religionist, this would appear to falsify the CoReligionist Hypothesis.
Contrasted with cross-sectional tests, which look at all 15 issues of Dabiq at once, as a
whole, longitudinal tests look at how Daesh’s messaging evolves over time. In each of my
longitudinal tests, I predict that Dabiq editors will prioritize targets by whom they feel most
threatened by focusing on them earliest. Similarly, I observe that Dabiq editors prioritize
arguments they feel are the strongest by making them earlier in their publication run. In my
reading of Dabiq, before I conducted the quantitative tests I display in this dissertation, I noticed
a pattern that seemed to support this. While this was very subjective, and not data-driven,
subsequent tests I have conducted do support my initial observations. I display the graphic
representation of my Concentric Rings Observation below and follow it with a written
explanation.
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What you see above is the visual representation of my subjective observations upon
reading the 15 issues of Dabiq. The words in the concentric rings refer to individuals, groups, or
institutions that Daesh targets, focuses on, or argues with over time in the publication run of
Dabiq. The rings expand in chronological order, and the group mentioned within each roughly
represents the order in which Daesh targets them. The smallest ring represents the first, or first
few issues of Dabiq, in which Daesh propagandists sought to establish legitimacy by tacitly or
explicitly pointing out distinguishing factors between themselves, and the groups most similar to
them, most notably, Al Qaeda, the organization which actually gave birth to Daesh.
The data from my longitudinal analysis supports my observation.
Perhaps the most important distinguishing characteristic and literal “claim to fame” of
Daesh was its aspiration, and later, ability to seize and control territory. Daesh’s aspiration to
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establish a global caliphate distinguished it from Al Qaeda, a group that, while capable of
successfully mounting spectacular terrorist attacks such as 9/11 made no particular effort to
control territory, at least not nearly to the extent of Daesh.
As time and subsequent issues of Dabiq continued, Daesh propagandists proceeded to
attack targets in a sequential manner. The unmistakable pattern that emerged was the sooner in
the publication run that Daesh attacked a target, the more similar that target tended to be to
Daesh. Similarly, the targets Daesh attacked later tended to be less similar to the group. Since
alliance forces were actively trying to kill Daesh propagandists (and indeed, one of its main
editors was killed in a drone strike shortly after the publication of the 15th and final issue of
Dabiq) it seemed to make sense that Daesh propagandists were systematically targeting
individuals, groups, and institutions that they felt were the most important ones to attack. My
logic was, and still is, that if Daesh propagandists have the sense (in some cases, correctly) that
their death is imminent, they would attack the targets they felt most threatened by. Similarly,
although the illustration does not depict this, it seemed to follow that Daesh would make its most
important arguments earlier, rather than later.
All that said, the above was completely subjective, and not data driven. But it was
intriguing, because testing this observation with data could help answer the specific question of
who Daesh fears the most. Further, and more importantly in the broader picture, it could help
answer the question of which individuals, groups or institutions could most effectively help a
counter-propaganda campaign.
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The next section goes on to analyze the data to see whether these subjective observations
were correct, and also to attempt to answer the predictiveness of the Co-Religionist Hypothesis
and related sub-questions.

Upon Which Major World Religions Does Daesh Focus Earliest?
As I have stated previously, the order in which Daesh targets individuals, groups or organizations
matters greatly. The United States was actively attempting to kill or capture Dabiq
propagandists, so it behooved them to attack their most important targets earlier, rather than
later, for the simple fact that, if killed or captured, the propagandists would cease to be able to
continue functioning as such. Also, it makes sense that Daesh would want to prioritize targets
longitudinally, because the group sought to recruit as many fighters as quickly as possible. Thus,
I make the assumption that if Dabiq attacks certain targets sooner in its publication run, Daesh
propagandists consider those targets to be greater, or more important, threats than those it attacks
in subsequent, later issues of Dabiq.
With this in mind, I used NVIVO and Excel to analyze Dabiq issue-by-issue to illustrate
trends of targets that Daesh propagandists attack. I split these targets up by religion, or lack
thereof. Therefore, I include below a chart that displays the number of times Dabiq mentions
“Christians,” “Jews,” “Muslims,” or “taghuts” (their transliterated term for secular, or nonbelieving actors, although Daesh uses this term also to refer to state-sanctioned muftis, deriding
them as being secular, because they recognize the authority of secular governments).
Specifically, Daesh defines “tawaghit” (plural of taghut) as being “tyrant unbelievers” (Dabiq
Issue 1, p. 25). Please note that the numbers across the horizontal axis in the following
illustration denote the issue numbers if Dabiq.
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Search terms: “Christian,” “Christianity,” “Jew,” “Judaism,” “Islam,” “Muslim,” “taghut,”
and all variations of the terms.
As readers may observe, Dabiq editors in every issue address Muslims and Islam more
frequently than actors of any other faith, or lack thereof. This supports the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis, since Daesh clearly considers arguments dealing with fellow Muslims to be more
important than arguments dealing with non-Muslims. As a side note, the terms “atheist” and
“atheism” never appear in any issue of Dabiq. Somewhat confusingly, Dabiq also occasionally
uses the term “taghut” to refer to state-sanctioned imams, denouncing them as having subverted
the practice of Islam and placing its supremacy under the authority of secular governments.
Daesh repeatedly targets state-sanctioned imams in its propaganda, deriding them as
misinterpreting Islam’s sacred texts in order to give cover to Western offenses to Islam, both
material and symbolic. I provide the following quotation from Dabiq to illustrate this scorn.
Dabiq writers here are railing on imams who in the aftermath of the massacre of Charlie Hebdo
editors in Paris issued messages of solidarity with the victims, rather than with the shooters, who
claimed to be members of Daesh. The 2015 massacre was widely viewed as retaliation for the
magazine’s lampooning of the Prophet Mohammad, both in cartoons and jokes (Borger, 2015).
Dabiq writers were incensed that anyone in the Muslim community, especially respected Muslim
leaders, would voice anything but approval for the killings:
Rasūlullāh (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) was the sword against the mushrikīn,
and his greatest companion, Abū Bakr as-Siddīq (radiyallāhu ‘anh), was the
sword against the murtaddīn… Where is this sword today to strike the necks of
those apostate imāms so as to deter them from kufr and zandaqah (heresy)? If just
one of them were killed, it would deter some of them and some of their followers
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from carrying on in their procession to Hellfire. Is there not a Muslim, whom
Allah loves and who loves Allah, ready to perform jihād and spill the blood of
such deviant callers? (Dabiq Issue 7, pp. 61)
One result in this chart that I found surprising is that Dabiq editors attacked or referenced
secular leaders more frequently than it attacked or referenced Christian or Jewish actors.
However, once I realized Daesh was using this term to refer to state-sanctioned muftis, it makes
sense, since these, according to the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, would rank extremely high as the
most effective intervenors in a religious conflict. This trend holds true in almost every issue of
Dabiq, leaving aside the second, third, and fourth issues, in which all the terms are mentioned
with roughly the same frequency, until the thirteenth and fifteenth issues, when Dabiq devotes
almost its entire magazine to engage with the Muslim Brotherhood, and Christianity,
respectively. In its fourteenth issue, Dabiq attacks Judaism and Shia Islam, and in it the number
of references to secular leaders slightly exceeds the number of references Christianity and
Judaism.
The fifteenth and final issue, aimed largely at Christianity, features a sharp downward
spike in both “secular” and Muslim targets. However, the number of references to Islam and
Muslim targets remains greater than the number of references to any other religious or secular
targets. This once again underscores the higher priority Daesh gives to Muslim targets.
This holds true in every issue of Dabiq: arguments dealing with Islam and Muslims far
exceed arguments dealing with other religions or non-religious targets. This supports the CoReligionist Hypothesis, in that Dabiq writers and editors consider arguments dealing with Islam
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as being more important to their propaganda efforts than arguments dealing with non-Muslim
targets.
Without doing any complex, in-depth analysis, casual readers of Dabiq (if there are such
people) likely will come away with the impression that the propagandists behind it are consumed
with the obsession of delegitimizing any forms of Islam other than Daesh’s interpretation of the
religion. That would be a correct impression. Daesh propagandists consider those who practice
or preach a version of Islam different than their own to pose a much greater threat than do actors
of other faiths or of no faith at all. Dabiq writers state this explicitly as illustrated by the quote
below:
… Groups of apostates among the Arabs, while still claiming to accept the
prophethood of Allah’s Messenger, alleged the existence of other prophets after
him, like Musaylimah, Sajāh, and Tulayhah; so despite calling themselves
“Muslims” and accepting most of the revelation from Allah to His Messenger,
their blood became halāl and killing them became wājib [required]. Thus, the
Hurūb ar-Riddah (Wars of Apostasy) were fought and were even given
precedence over fighting the mushrikīn of Rome and Persia. It is also known that
the kufr of apostasy is worse, by consensus, than original kufr. As such, fighting
the apostates takes priority over fighting the original kāfir (Dabiq Issue 14, p. 10).
What concerns Daesh propagandists more – the threats posed by actors who are from
other sects of Islam, or threats from other religions? For example, does Daesh feel more
threatened by messages from a Shia cleric, or from a Jewish rabbi? While the block quote above
seems to make this obvious, I will quantify it in order to put the quote into context. Does a
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Muslim who disagrees with Daesh’s interpretation of Islam pose more or less of a threat than a
Christian minister?
I have made a graph to represent the data on this topic. It represents the raw number of
mentions of each religion and sect per issue, regardless of page numbers or the overall content of
the issue. What follows is the visual representation of my longitudinal analysis of these
arguments. The graph below shows the shifting and evolving strategic focuses that Daesh uses
from issue to issue of Dabiq. Following the graph, I will analyze these results.
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Search terms: “Christian,” “Jew,” “Hindu,” “Islam,” “Muslim,” “Sufi,” “Sufiyyah,” “Salafi,”
“Safawi,” “Murtadd,” and all variations of the terms.
So far, the breakdown of word counts across the publication of Dabiq indicates that
Daesh is much more preoccupied with arguing against the legitimacy of different sects of Islam,
specifically Sunni Islam, than it is in engaging in arguments with religious leaders of other faiths,
such as Christianity or Judaism.
Analyzing the degree to which Daesh preoccupies itself with arguments in this IntraReligious genre, as opposed to arguments against religious figures who are not Co-Religionists
matters greatly, because if Daesh considers deviations from its interpretation of Islam to be a
greater threat to its propaganda efforts than the practice of other faiths entirely, this helps us
identify (or rather allows Daesh to identify for us) the best potential intervenors in a counterpropaganda campaign.

Longitudinal Analysis of Intra- Vs. Inter-Religious Argumentation
This analysis will look at the evolution of Daesh’s focus on Intra- Vs. Inter-Religious arguments,
and how Daesh strategically shifts these focuses over time. Once more, I predict that Daesh will
make its most important arguments and attack its most threatening targets earlier in the
publication run of Dabiq. If Daesh attacks a certain target earlier, I predict Daesh considers that
target to be more threatening, and thus more useful in a counterpropaganda campaign. Similarly,
if Daesh uses a certain type of argument earlier, I predict Daesh considers that argument to be
more important than types of arguments it makes later in the publication run. The implication of
this would be that engaging with Daesh on these arguments it makes earlier in its publication run
would be a more effective strategy than engaging with arguments it makes later in the
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publication run. I will organize this section to look at the evolving focus Dabiq places on each
term that is represented in the above graph.
“Christians”: The focus on Christians, and theological arguments with them, stays
extremely low, relative to other terms and arguments throughout the publication run of Dabiq,
that is, until the final issue, which is largely devoted to trying to delegitimize Christianity. This
issue, titled Breaking the Cross, spends many pages attacking the validity of the New Testament,
and specifically, the credentials of the Apostle Paul.
When attacking Christianity in general (as opposed to focusing attacks on the Apostle
Paul in particular) Daesh denies both the divinity and crucifixion of Jesus Christ, although Daesh
does refer to him as “The Messiah” (Dabiq Issue 15, pp. 46-64). Further, regarding Jesus Christ,
Daesh claims to demonstrate that “the true religion of Jesus Christ is a pure monotheistic
submission – called Islam – and that when he returns in the final days, the Messiah will adhere to
the Law of Muhammad and wage jihad for the cause of Allah” (p. 49). Further, Daesh disputes
the authenticity and accuracy of the Christian New Testament for a number of reasons, including
various inconstancies between the Gospels, disputed authorship of the Gospels, inconsistencies
between each of the Gospels and the Old Testament, and the allegedly political manner with
which the Roman Empire selected certain doctrines, such as the Holy Trinity, divinity of Christ,
the crucifixion of Christ, and timing of certain holidays, such as December 25 for Jesus Christ’s
birthday (pp. 50-64).
Daesh’s attacks on the Apostle Paul take a two-pronged approach, the first being to
attempt to discredit his legitimacy by labeling him as an imposter purposefully tried to derail the
early church movement of Christianity. To this end, Dabiq writers point out that Paul himself
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described how he persecuted Christians early on, even going so far as to hold the cloaks of men
who stoned to death an early Christian named Stephen (The Book of Acts 7:54-60, King James
Version).
The second type of attack focuses more specifically on Paul’s contribution to Christian
theology, and this appears to constitute Daesh’s motivation for choosing this particular New
Testament writer from among the others. As anyone with a relatively decent familiarity with the
New Testament and the Gospels will know, one of the Apostle Paul’s main theological
contributions to Christianity was his message of salvation by grace, rather than a legalistic
approach to religion. Daesh references Paul’s writings to demonstrate this, and then commentates
on them, arguing that setting aside the Law of Moses is tantamount to heresy. A seemingly
tangential point that actually would resonate with most Protestant Fundamentalists is that Daesh
appears to use the New International Version (NIV) of the Bible, rather than the King James
Version (KJV). This is notable because most Protestant Fundamentalists use the KJV, some even
arguing that the translators who produced it were themselves divinely inspired in their work,
despite the fact that multiple historical records show that the translators of the KJV disagreed
with one another throughout the entire process about specific translation decisions (Moss, 2018).
In fact, some Protestant Fundamentalists go so far as to claim that any other version but the KJV
is an insidious perversion of their faith that literally leads to Satan worship (Riplinger, 1993).
One likely reason for Daesh choosing a version other than the KJV is that the NIV is more
accessible to modern speakers of English – their target audience.
Another possible reason for this choice is that Daesh makes multiple arguments against
the authenticity and accuracy of any biblical translation, in contrast with the Quran, which most
Muslims read in its original Arabic. With this in mind, it is possible that Daesh, a fundamentalist
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Islamic group, may have avoided the use of the KJV, the one translation that fundamentalist
Christians claim is inerrant, as a further denigration of those claims.
In any case, since I aim for this dissertation ultimately to produce lessons that may
broadly be applied to conflicts involving fundamentalists of all religions, I opt here to use the
KJV, the Protestant Fundamentalists’ Bible translation of choice, for each of Daesh’s quotations
from the Apostle Paul. I also quote them in their context, since Daesh tends to abbreviate quotes.
The first quotation illustrates how the Apostle Paul, in his earlier years before he converted,
persecuted Christians. Daesh uses the quote to support their claim that Paul never had a change
of heart, and that he merely changed tactics to pretend to convert to Christianity in order to
pervert it. The quotes that follow the initial one show Paul arguing against a legalistic approach
to Christianity.
I verily thought with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name
of Jesus of Nazareth. Which thing I also did in Jerusalem: and many of the saints
did I shut up in prison, having received authority from the chief priests; and when
they were put to death, I gave my voice against them. And I punished them oft in
every synagogue, and compelled them to blaspheme; and being exceedingly mad
against them, I persecuted them even unto strange cities (Acts 26:9-11, KVJ).
Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us: for
it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree: That the blessing of
Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ; that we might receive
the promise of the Spirit through faith (Galatians 3:13, KJV).
But if ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not under the law (Galatians 5:18, KJV).
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For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. For
Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, That the man which doeth
those things shall live by them. But the righteousness which is of faith speaketh
on this wise, Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to
bring Christ down from above:) Or, Who shall descend into the deep? (that is, to
bring up Christ again from the dead.) But what saith it? The word is nigh thee,
even in thy mouth, and in thy heart: that is, the word of faith, which we preach;
That if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine
heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved (Romans 10:4-9
KJV).
Daesh responds to these quotations of Paul by writing, “This is like the extreme Suffis
who claim that when a person reaches a high spiritual status, the Shari’ah no longer applies to
him – a concept roundly rejected by all Muslims” (Dabiq Issue 15, p. 56). The main thrust of
Daesh’s attacks on the Apostle Paul’s legitimacy is aimed at his teachings against a legalistic
approach to religion, and his emphasis on grace-based redemption.
Now, the fact that I have devoted several pages to Daesh’s attacks on one specific figure
in Christianity should not distract from the larger point of this dissertation: that Daesh spends
much more time engaging with other sects of Islam than with other faiths or with secular groups.
Even in this one issue that spends, as compared to other issues, the most time attacking the
legitimacy of Christianity, Dabiq still spends much more time discussing issues pertaining to
Islam, and perceived deviancy within the religion. Mentions of Christianity remain low
throughout issues 1-12, and start climbing slightly in issue 13, levels off at issue 14, and then
spikes in issue 15, but never surpass the frequency of mentions of Islam and Intra-Religious
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Arguments. In fact, the term “Christian” does not even appear in Dabiq until its second issue –
although mentions of “Crusades” and “Crusaders” appear throughout the publication run of
Dabiq. I do not consider the term “Crusade” to necessarily refer to an Inter-Religious Target or
Argument because Daesh uses it often as a catch-all term that applies to the West, including
secular figures, and frequently uses it without a specific religious connotation, despite, or more
likely, because of, the loaded nature of that term in the Middle East. Most important for a
longitudinal analysis, the overall trend of arguments targeting Christians is for them to increase
gradually over time. Based on my prediction that Daesh will attack the most threatening targets
earlier, this would mean that Daesh considers Christians, Christianity, and arguments from and
against them, to be of a low priority relative to Intra-Religious Arguments.
“Jews”: The frequency of arguments targeting Jews also remains extremely low relative
to Intra-Religious arguments. Similar to arguments pertaining to Christians, Jews are mentioned
rarely until issue 9, where Dabiq makes the argument that Christianity is somewhat more
legitimate than Judaism, because Christians accepted the Prophet Issa (Jesus), while Jews
rejected him. However, Dabiq concludes that neither Christianity nor Judaism is legitimate
compared to Islam, specifically, of course, Daesh’s version of it. Arguments targeting Jews and
Judaism reduce in frequency in subsequent issues until they hit a final peak in issue 13, which,
interestingly enough, mentions them mostly to state that Shia Muslims are a greater threat to
Daesh’s efforts to build a global caliphate than are “the spiteful Jews.” The trend in this
longitudinal analysis is clear: arguments targeting Jews appear very infrequently throughout the
entire publication run, but also start out extremely infrequently, and gradually increase over time.
This, again, supports the hypothesis that Daesh prioritizes Intra-Religious Arguments and targets
over Inter-Religious Arguments and targets.

134

“Muslims”: The term “Muslim” occurs by far the most frequently on this list in every
issue of Dabiq, save issue 13, where the term “Apostate” towers over all terms in the graph. (As
a side note, the term “Apostate” also is a term associated with Intra-Religious Arguments, so this
also supports, rather than contradicts, the Co-Religionist Hypothesis.) The first issue of Dabiq, in
which Daesh defines itself as an organization, including listing its goals, methods, reasons for
existence, and how it distinguishes itself from other militant groups, such as Al Qaeda, uses the
terms “Muslim” and “Islam” far more than it mentions any other religion.
Please note that, while the above chart might seem to indicate that mentions of “Islam”
and “Muslims” increase over time, as a percentage of the total number of terms analyzed in the
following two graphs, they decrease from 54 to 37 percent of the total between issues 1 and 15.
So, with the prediction that Daesh will prioritize Intra-Religious Arguments earlier in the
publication run, and devote more space to Inter-Religious or Secular arguments, this again
supports the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. The two graphs below illustrate the decline in the
frequency of references to “Islam” or “Muslims” as a percentage over time between the first and
last issue of Dabiq. This, once again, supports the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, since longitudinal
tests show Daesh propagandists prioritizing Muslim targets over targets who are not CoReligionist in their chronology.
Search terms for both graphs below: “Christian,” “Crusade,” “Deviant,”“Jew,” “Judaism,”
“Islam,” “Kufar,”“Muslim,” “Murtadd,” “Rafida,” “Tawaghit,” and all variations of the
terms.
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Inter- Vs. Intra-Religious Targets Issue 1

"Christians" Freq

2%

"Jews"
"Muslims"
"Murtadd" (or "apostate")

16%

(Apostate/rejector/apostacy) rafada
OR Rāfidah OR riddah

1%

"Kufr"

17%
"Deviant" and its synonyms
Taghut OR tawaghit OR tāghūt OR
tawāghīt(secular, usually government
or government official)
Crusade OR Crusader OR Crusades

54%
3%
7%
0%
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Inter- Vs. Intra-Religious Targets Issue 15
"Christians" Freq
"Jews"
"Muslims"
"Murtadd" (or "apostate")
(Apostate/rejector/apostacy) rafada OR Rafidah OR riddah
"Kufr"
"Deviant" and its synonyms
Taghut and its variants(secular, usually government or government official)
Crusade OR Crusader OR Crusades

1%
4%
13%

1%

4%
28%

1%
1%

37%

10%
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Findings
This section explains my findings that I take from the data analysis. I will first summarize to
what extent the tests I have conducted, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, support the CoReligionist Hypothesis. It will explain their relationship both to the Co-Religionist Hypothesis
and the Co-Sectarian Hypothesis and give a verdict on whether each has been supported or not
supported by the evidence. I start with test results, and how they pertain to the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis.

Test Results
I conclude that the evidence supports the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. The cross-sectional analysis
shows that, across the board, throughout the entire publication run of Dabiq, Daesh
propagandists devoted far more time, energy, and magazine space to attacking their coreligionists than attacking actors who were either secular or were of religions other than Islam.
So, too, the results of the longitudinal tests support the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. My
initial observation, based simply on reading issues of Dabiq without actually quantifying or
analyzing the targets of Daesh, was that Daesh propagandists began arguing with, or at least
distinguishing itself from, scholars or religious leaders who were most similar to Daesh. The first
issue of Dabiq, as I have pointed out previously, spends much of its time and space explaining
who Daesh is, but, more importantly for purposes of this research, the first issue of Dabiq
explains who Daesh is not. For instance, Daesh is Sunni, but more important, Daesh takes pains
to distinguish its theological positions as superior to any other Sunnis.
Prior to my analysis quantifying precisely how often Daesh targeted specific groups in its
arguments, my impression upon reading Dabiq was that Daesh considered non-Sunni groups to
be so irrelevant to either bolstering or threatening its worldview that it put a very low priority on
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arguing with them. That is still my impression and is supported by the fact that Dabiq editors do
not get around to devoting the theme of an entire issue to justifying the killing of Shia and the
destruction of Shia-dominated national governments until the thirteenth issue of the magazine.
My observation, as illustrated by my Concentric Rings diagram, that Daesh propagandists
prioritize arguments with and against targets that are more similar to them than less similar to
them is borne out by my actual quantitative textual analysis. Daesh barely mentions nonAbrahamic religions, with the words “Buddhist” and “Hindu” appearing only a handful of times
throughout the entire publication run of Dabiq.
As for the single mention of Sikhism, when considered both in the realm of military
conquest and propaganda campaigns, it makes sense that Daesh would have barely mentioned
the religion. Sikhs, having mostly Hindu roots, are not Co-Religionists with Daesh, and thus do
not pose a legitimacy threat from a theological or propaganda standpoint. From a military
standpoint, there is no Sikh-majority nation in existence, and no significant communities of
Sikhs live in either Iraq or Syria. The fact that Sikhs are mentioned only once in Dabiq is one
more – albeit small – bit of information to support the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, since, if Daesh
attacked them more frequently, that would indicate that the hypothesis was not predictive.
All of these together support the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, since I have begun to see coreligionists not as a binary, a check “yes” or check “no” possibility, but rather as a sliding scale.
There are degrees of co-religiosity, and with a fundamentalist sect such as Daesh, these degrees
become extremely important. The sliding scale can be seen and experienced by reading the
issues of Dabiq in the order they were published, beginning with Daesh pointing out
characteristics that distinguish it, first from fellow Sunnis, then from fellow Sunnis who support,
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work with, or derive their legitimacy from secular governments, and so on, moving their sights
incrementally, issue-by-issue, to target groups and individuals who first are most similar to
Daesh, and then moving on to targets that are less similar to Daesh. Just as Dabiq does not
devote an entire issue to target Shia Muslims, a group Daesh considers quite dissimilar to
themselves, until the thirteenth issue, Dabiq does not devote an entire issue to target Christians
until its fifteenth and final issue.

Causal Analysis
I take the above findings to mean that Daesh propagandists consider actors who are more similar
to them in religious beliefs to pose more of a threat to their recruitment propaganda efforts than
do actors who are least similar to them in religious beliefs. Christians and Jews share many of the
same prophets and teachings with Muslims, as all three faiths spring from the Abrahamic
traditions. Thus, they earn prominent spaces in Dabiq as targets for argument and killing, but not
as prominent as Daesh’s fellow Muslims.
Ranking of frequency of mentions goes as follows: Islam, by far, is the most frequent.
Then, somewhat surprisingly, are secular targets, followed distantly by mentions of Judaism and
Christianity. This was a surprise to me, because I had predicted that Judaism and Christianity
would take second place, not secular targets. The reason I assumed this was that inter-faith
dialogue, next to co-religionist dialogue, is also a popular approach to counter-propaganda in
conflicts involving religion.
However, upon reflection, the fact that Daesh refers to secular targets more frequently
than non-secular, non-co-religious targets does seem to make sense within the context of the CoReligionist Hypothesis for a specific reason. It makes sense because Daesh scorns secular
governments in Muslim-majority countries, deeming them to be illegitimate in the face of
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Daesh’s aspirations to take global control as an Islamic caliphate. “Taghut” governments are not
legitimate in Daesh’s worldview, and pose a threat to Daesh’s aspirations, since moderate
Muslims might prefer a secular, less intrusive government over the draconian, barbaric ruling
style favored by Daesh. More specifically, Daesh seeks to discredit state-sanctioned clerics,
deriding them as being puppets of secular governments, which Daesh considers illegitimate. So,
while a perfunctory reading of the results of this analysis might seem to suggest that Daesh is
almost as concerned with discrediting and attacking secular actors as it is with discrediting and
attacking its fellow Muslims, or co-religionists, in reality, Daesh’s repeated attacks on “taghuts”
is really an extension of its obsession with trying to discredit and delegitimize its co-religionists.
One sub-question that remains partially unanswered relates to Daesh’s targeting of cosectarians and co-fundamentalists. If violent religious fundamentalists such as Daesh view
various actors on a sliding scale of threat level based on the similarity or lack thereof of those
actors to Daesh’s religious world view, it would seem to follow that Daesh would spend far more
time obsessing over arguments with actors who are the most similar to them.
For example, and more specifically, it would seem to follow that Daesh would obsess
over its differences with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, the group from which Daesh
splintered, more than it obsesses about its differences with actors who would be several degrees
removed from Daesh, for example, Sunni clerics who are affiliated with secular governments.
The longitudinal tests do support this fully: indeed, Dabiq’s first issue is devoted to pointing out
the distinctions between Daesh and its fellow Sunnis, and Al Qaeda. This would be predicted by
the assumptions that Daesh would attack targets it feels most threaten its legitimacy, or at least
compete most strongly for the same followers and potential recruits. However, cross-sectional
tests do not necessarily support this. Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, although mentioned
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occasionally throughout the publication run of Dabiq, do not continue to figure as prominent
targets overall. In fact, Dabiq editors actually quoted Osama bin Laden occasionally, and
claimed still to revere him to some degree, despite some differences.
It is possible that the reason for this is that this particular concentric ring has become so
small that it simply does not contain a large number of scholars with which Daesh could argue.
Fundamentalists, by their hyper-sectarian nature, comprise a very small percentage of any major
world religion. With this in mind, one possible explanation for why Dabiq editors demonstrate
their prioritization of arguments with co-fundamentalists by placing them earlier in publication,
but do not continue these arguments to any great extent throughout subsequent issues of Dabiq,
is that they simply did not have that much material to work with. Put succinctly: Longitudinal
tests support the Co-Fundamentalist Hypothesis, while cross-sectional tests are inconclusive.

Conclusion
In conclusion I find that the evidence leads to two main findings: 1) The Co-Religionist
Hypothesis is supported, and 2) The Co-Sectarian Hypothesis is partially, but not conclusively
supported. The first, and broadest question I asked is what the Co-Religionist Hypothesis seeks
to answer: In a violent conflict in which religion is a major factor, are the best interveners of the
same religion as the belligerents (in other words, “co-religionists”)? Under this over-arching
question I asked several sub-questions. Are the best interveners co-sect? Are they cofundamentalist? How threatening to their legitimacy do violent religious fundamentalists find
secular leaders, as opposed to co-religionist leaders, or as opposed to religious leaders who are
not co-religionist? Do violent religious propagandists see intra-faith, as opposed to inter-faith
arguments, to be more powerful?

142

All of these questions followed logically from the gaps in the literature, which I reviewed
in Chapter 3, and must be answered in order to fill the gap I have previously discussed.
To reach my conclusions, I began by describing Daesh’s proselytization and
radicalization propaganda efforts as a strategic, incremental endeavor. Specific examples
demonstrate how Daesh chooses and prioritizes targets to attack, sources to cite, and arguments
to make with deliberation, and not haphazardly.
Then I described the materials I would analyze, namely, the 15 issues of Daesh’s flagship
print publication, Dabiq. I explained Dabiq’s importance, as it is the only long-form written
publication Daesh published (before changing its name to Rumiyah), and the only place where
one can observe and analyze Daesh defining itself, to make complex theological arguments for
its own legitimacy and to delegitimize others.
My analysis took two forms: cross-sectional and longitudinal. For my cross-sectional
analysis I put all 15 issues of Dabiq into the textual analysis program NVIVO and used this
program to quantify how frequently Daesh chose to engage with secular versus religious figures,
or with Co-Religionist figures versus non-Co-Religionist figures. Every test showed that Daesh
writers and editors concerned themselves much more with Co-Religionist figures than with either
secular figures or religious figures of different religions.
For my longitudinal tests I made the assumption, based on observation, that Daesh would
make arguments it felt to be most important and most compelling earlier in the publication run of
Dabiq. I also predicted that Daesh would attack in its theological arguments targets it felt most
threatened by, and also appeal to sources of authority it felt most bolstered by earlier in the
publication run. Targets that threated Daesh less would appear later in Dabiq’s publication run.
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Every longitudinal test that I conducted showed that Daesh feared Co-Religionists more than
non-Co-Religionists, whether they be religious or secular.
I interpret the results of the longitudinal tests to support the Co-Religionist Hypothesis,
since Daesh prioritized targets and arguments that were Co-Religionist or attacked the legitimacy
of Co-Religionists over secular or non-Co-Religionist targets. In general the focus of the
respective issues of Dabiq begin with an intense internal focus, with the first issue devoted
almost entirely to defining what Daesh is as a religious group, organization, and state. This first
issue also, similarly, in defining what Daesh is not, starts extremely close to home, pointing out
its differences from other militant Islamist groups that to an outside observer might seem very
similar. From there, as illustrated in my Concentric Rings Observation, Dabiq expands its focus
incrementally, issue-by-issue, to attack groups that progressively are less and less like Daesh.
But, tellingly, Daesh propagandists never expand their focus further away from their own
religious identity than the three major Abrahamic religions.
I find that the evidence I have presented supports the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. My
assumptions were that Daesh would identify the most effective intervenors by attacking them
more frequently throughout the publication of Dabiq (cross-sectional tests) and also earlier in the
publication run of Dabiq longitudinal tests. Both sets of tests showed that Daesh focuses more
heavily on co-religionists than either secular targets or targets that are of other religions.
To summarize: the cross-sectional test that looked at which religions Daesh targeted the
most showed that Daesh obsessed about Muslim targets much more than on religious figures or
institutions that were not Muslim. The cross-sectional test that looked at religious targets versus
secular targets similarly showed that Daesh feared Muslim targets more than non-Muslim
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targets. Surprisingly to me, however, the same test showed that Daesh fears secular targets more
than religious non-Muslim ones.
Longitudinal tests similarly supported the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. Arguments
attacking Muslim targets remained the highest in frequency versus other targets throughout the
entire publication run of Dabiq, even in the final issues, which gave the heaviest weight to nonMuslim religious targets. Additionally, and more to the point of the longitudinal tests, attacks on
Christians and Jews generally increased with subsequent publications. This demonstrates that
Daesh put a higher priority on attacking Muslim targets than non-Muslim targets, since it
focused more on Muslim targets earlier, and on non-Muslim targets later in the publication run of
Dabiq. Taking all of these tests into consideration, I conclude that the evidence supports the CoReligionist Hypothesis. The following chapter summarizes this dissertation, gives further
analysis and provides policy recommendations.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
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This chapter concludes my dissertation and provides final thoughts on the topic. I have pursued a
two-fold agenda in the preceding pages; first, to fill the gap in the literature pertaining to the
efficacy of certain types of peaceful intervenors in religious conflict, and second, to begin to lay
the theoretical groundwork for devising an effective, peaceful counterpropaganda campaign in a
violent religious conflict. This dissertation comes as the culmination of roughly four years of my
immersion in all aspects of Daesh propaganda and represents a very difficult personal journey.
My hope is that in the process of exposing myself to some of the most barbaric aspects of human
cruelty and depravity I have produced analysis and data that will in some way contribute to
future peaceful interventions.
In this chapter I summarize each of the previous chapters, re-state my research question,
discuss how the literature leads logically to the research question, explain how my research
answers the research question, and then discuss implications. Supported by this research, I then
make a few modest policy recommendations. Finally, I provide a brief overview of how my
ideas on this project evolved over time, and suggest directions for future, related research.

Summary of the Research
Literature Review
The double-edged sword of doing research in a relatively young area like religion and conflict
analysis is that it is not difficult to find gaps in the literature, but the existing literature in this
field of inquiry is relatively thin. A researcher in this field will find more literature on the role
religion plays in fomenting conflict than in building peace. I will briefly summarize some of the
key concepts that emerged from my review of the literature, starting with the Ambivalence of the
Sacred.
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The term “Ambivalence of the Sacred” refers to the fact that the sacred texts of all major
world religions endorse and command acts of violence, even to the point of acts of genocide –
and it also is true that these same texts contain passages that command followers to be peaceful
and neighborly. This “ambivalence” of the sacred texts provides religious leaders with
opportunities to reference their sacred texts selectively, depending on whether they wish to
inspire their congregations to violence or peace. Religious leaders play a key role in this regard,
especially in the context of fundamentalist religious sects (Appleby, 2000).
The literature on religious fundamentalists shows that, regardless of the particular
religion to which they belong, they share common characteristics. Among these are the
prevalence of patriarchal family and societal structures, an extraordinary connection to their
sacred texts, and a reverence for respected religious leaders who have a superior command of the
sacred text. Perhaps more interesting is that fundamentalists exhibit a strong tendency to hold
beliefs about their own movements that are directly at odds with reality. These – regardless of
which religion – include the notion that they, the fundamentalists themselves, more so than any
other sects of their religion, practice their religion in its truest, most historically authentic form,
and that all other forms of worship are invalid. In reality, religious fundamentalism itself, as
defined by The Fundamentalism Project, is a relatively modern development. In practice, for all
their talk of returning to their religion’s historic roots and shunning modernity, religious
fundamentalists selectively use and coopt modern innovations, including forms of government,
new media, sophisticated military weaponry, and even new forms of terror attacks as is
convenient for them. Religious fundamentalists tend to profess that they, more than any other
sects of their respective religions, hold in reverence the literal interpretation of their sacred texts.
In reality, while they do tend to be able to quote extensively from their sacred texts, religious
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fundamentalists blatantly cherry-pick passages that suit their purposes, take them out of context
as needed, and ignore other passages that are at odds with their needs (Appleby, 2018).
The literature shows that some of above-listed characteristics may provide opportunities
for peaceful intervenors to dissuade potential recruits from joining forces with violent, religious
fundamentalists. Potential recruits to propaganda campaigns from these groups would tend to
defer to figures they perceive as holding authority within the religion, especially those who seem
to hold a high command of its sacred text. Such figures who wish to preach, broadcast or
otherwise disseminate a peaceful religious message might be the key to countering the violent
messaging of their co-religionists.
My review of the literature exposed a research gap in the broader area of the role of
religion in peacebuilding, as contrasted with research done into the role of religion in violence.
Narrowing the focus slightly, I found that research suggests that respected religious leaders can
play instrumental roles as peacebuilders. More specifically, literature suggests that religious
leaders can use religious arguments to further the cause of peacebuilding. This logically led me
to the question: What type of figure would be most effective in staging a peaceful intervention in
a conflict in which religion plays a major role?
Several organizations and scholars operate on the assumption that the most effective
figure to stage a peaceful intervention in a conflict where religion plays a major role would be a
“co-religionist,” meaning that person would be of the same religion as the belligerents. This is
known as the “Co-Religionist Hypothesis.” While the few organizations that operate in this area
tend to assume that the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is predictive, my review of the literature
revealed this hypothesis had never been measured empirically. This is the specific gap I have
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sought to fill with my dissertation: Are the most effective intervenors in a conflict in which
religion plays a major role co-religionists? Related sub-questions include: If co-religionists are
indeed the most effective intervenors in these types of conflicts, what type of co-religionist
would be most effective? Would a co-sectarian be more effective? Would a co-fundamentalist be
more effective? Further, if we have established a description of the most effective peaceful
messenger, what type of messaging might prove most effective?

Daesh & Its Propaganda
As I have written previously, Daesh made use of many forms of modern media to spread its
violent radicalization and recruitment propaganda. Daesh used the Dark Web, Facebook,
Telegram, Tik Tok, Twitter, and other platforms to disseminate its messaging. Since Daesh, as a
religious fundamentalist sect, places an extraordinary emphasis on the written word, specifically
upon the literal passages from its sacred texts, the Hadith and Quran, I see the long-form
magazine Dabiq as the most important form of media in which to analyze Daesh propaganda.
Dabiq, unlike other forms of Daesh propaganda, provides Daesh with an unlimited amount of
space to make written arguments about its purpose and legitimacy, and to attempt to delegitimize
other groups. That is why I chose Dabiq for my research materials.

Methodology
I used the textual analysis software program NVIVO to analyze the magazine Dabiq and
quantify how much and how early in the publication run of Dabiq Daesh propagandists
preoccupied themselves with seeking to discredit certain figures and institutions. I also
quantified how early and how frequently Daesh propagandists used certain types of arguments,
splitting the types of arguments into “intra-faith” and “inter-faith” arguments, referring to
whether the targets Daesh argued with belonged to Islam, if they were secular, or if they
belonged to a different religion.
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The literature suggests that co-religionists comprise the greatest asset to de-radicalization.
This means that, if the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is correct, co-religionists also pose the greatest
threat to would-be radicalizers. As a strategic and intelligent actor, Daesh would prioritize its
most threatening targets in its propaganda. Not only would Daesh do this by attacking its most
threatening targets more frequently, it would also prioritize them by attacking them earlier in its
propaganda campaign.
If Daesh prioritizes co-religionists over non-co-religionists, this means that co-religionists
pose a greater threat to Daesh’s propaganda efforts. The same logic applies to the types of
argumentation – if Daesh prioritizes “intra-faith” arguments over “inter-faith” arguments, this
means Daesh considers co-religionists a greater threat to its radicalization and recruitment
propaganda efforts. Therefore, if Daesh prioritizes intra-faith arguments, and prioritizes
arguments with co-religionists, the evidence supports that co-religionists are the most effective
peaceful intervenors, and intra-faith arguments are the most effective peaceful types of
messaging those messengers can use. This demonstrates that the Co-Religionist Hypothesis is
predictive.
Daesh uses a peculiar form of transliteration from Arabic to English when referring to
certain religious concepts. The major reason is that Daesh uses its own definitions for all of these
concepts, and these definitions differ greatly from the commonly-accepted ones. One example of
this is “takfirism,” which refers to the practice of declaring a person, a group, or a sect to be
practicing a deviant form of Islam. Literature shows that Daesh has narrowed its definition of
what is “true Islam” while simultaneously broadening the scope of who is considered “kufr,” or
unbelievers, to include large swathes of Muslims.
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The fact that Daesh transliterates terms such as “takfir,” “kufr,” and other key religious
concepts means that researchers can use software programs like NVIVO to search for these terms
and quantify their usage. My research used this to demonstrate that Daesh prioritized arguments
with fellow Muslims over arguments with non-Muslims, and prioritized intra-faith debates over
inter-faith debates, and also over arguments with or attacks on secular targets, such as heads of
state.

Analysis
My analysis shows that Daesh prioritizes intra-faith arguments over inter-faith or secular
arguments. This means that Daesh spent much more time arguing finer points of Islamic
theology and practice than it did arguing against secularism or with other religions. The only two
non-Islamic religions Daesh propagandists spent any significant time and space arguing against
are Christianity and Judaism. Even when combining those two categories, mentions of
Christianity and Judaism only made up one quarter of Daesh propagandists religious mentions,
while roughly three-quarters of religious mentions referenced Islam or Muslims.
Not only do Daesh propagandists prioritize intra-faith arguments by using them much
more frequently across the entire publication run of Dabiq, they also prioritize them over time.
Daesh propagandists make intra-faith arguments against those it perceived to be deviating,
leaving, or polluting the Muslim faith much more frequently than they do against those who are
not Muslim. This means that intra-faith arguments pose a greater threat to Daesh radicalization
and recruitment propaganda than do secular or inter-faith arguments. This supports the CoReligionist Hypothesis.
My analysis also shows that Daesh prioritizes attacking its fellow Muslims, or coreligionists, as targets in its propaganda far and away more than it attacks non-Muslims.
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Although Daesh in its extreme form of sectarianism argues that the vast majority of those who
claim to be Muslim are not actually Muslim, or are practicing Islam in an incorrect manner, the
reality is that Daesh itself is in a very, very small minority within Islam, and is roundly
condemned by mainstream Muslim religious leaders. This supports the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis.
Although this dissertation has largely examined the Co-Religionist Hypothesis as a
binary issue – “are the most effective interveners co-religionist or not?” – a larger, more nuanced
pattern emerges from the data. Taking all of the analysis into account, a more accurate way to
describe the way Daesh perceives threats is a continuum. This continuum starts with Daesh itself
at one end, followed immediately by groups most similar to Daesh, such as Al Qaeda, followed
by groups and individuals who are successively, incrementally, less and less similar to Daesh.
The groups that are most similar to Daesh threaten Daesh the most. The groups that are less
similar to Daesh threaten Daesh the least. At the far end of the continuum we find three groups
that are all different enough from Daesh that they occupy this extreme end, yet are similar
enough that Daesh perceives them as a threat – at least, enough of a threat for Daesh to bother
attacking them. These final three groups, in order, are Shia Muslims, Jews, and Christians. The
order in which they appear is significant, because it is also the ranking of similarity each holds to
Daesh. Even though these three, out of all the targets Daesh propagandists attack, are the least
similar to Daesh, they still have common roots. Shia Muslims, Jews, and Christians, are all, like
Sunni Muslims, considered “People of the Book,” meaning they all come from Abrahamic
Traditions. This is significant because the only two targets Daesh attacked that were not coreligionists were still the most similar religions to Islam, at least based on their theological,
geographic, and demographic roots. The significance of the above analysis is that my findings
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did not only support the Co-Religionist Hypothesis. My findings go beyond the Co-Religionist
Hypothesis to describe something that could be called a Religionist Continuum, a theoretical
structure upon which all of the varying degrees of similarity of religiosity can find their spots.
Along this Religionist Continuum I find places for co-sectarians, co-fundamentalists, coreligionists, and co-monotheists, with a potentially infinite number of narrower defining
characteristics between all of these, that, depending on the level of granularity preferred by the
researcher, could vary depending on the position one holds on particular aspects of theology or
even religious customs.

Implications
The implications of these findings are wide-ranging, and can be applied to other contexts
globally, regardless of the religion(s) involved. Most of the aspects of Daesh that set it apart
within Islam are the same aspects that set apart other religious fundamentalist groups from their
respective religions. These characteristics, listed in the volumes of The Fundamentalism Project,
exhibit themselves in religious fundamentalists who are Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh,
or other religions: patriarchy, a reverence for and deference to religious leaders and their
respective sacred texts, totalitarianism, and a selective rejection of modernity, among others.
The narrow implications of my research are that the evidence indicates that the most
effective peaceful intervenors in the context of Daesh and its recruitment and radicalization
propaganda are going to be fellow Muslims who are widely respected for their scholarship within
Islam and who hold a strong command of their sacred texts. The most effective messaging they
can use will rely heavily upon direct quotations from Islam’s sacred texts, the Hadith and Quran.
The broader implications are that these principles can be applied to other religions, and other
conflicts and contexts. For instance, the most effective peaceful intervenor in conflicts driven by
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the violence of the Indian BJP and RSS would be respected Hindu religious leaders. On a smaller
scale, the most effective (non-governmental) intervenors to halt physical abuse of spouses or
children in the case of Independent Fundamental Baptists in the United States would be
respected, Christian leaders, preferably within similar congregations.
However, emphasizing the efficacy of co-religionist intervenors and intra-faith messaging
is not to say that interventions designed around inter-faith dialogue cannot be effective. It simply
means that those who are most likely to find themselves swayed by propaganda from violent,
fundamentalist religious groups will tend to listen only to religious leaders of their own religion,
and listen only to messaging that is rooted in their own religion. Other segments of the
population, even people who claim the same faith for themselves, may find inter-faith or secular
messaging to be persuasive. These people would not comprise the core demographic that Daesh
and other violent, fundamentalist religious groups intend their propaganda. Thus, they would be
irrelevant to the purposes of this study.
In conclusion, the data supports the Co-Religionist Hypothesis, and the implications of
these findings can be applied to religious conflicts around the globe, regardless of the particular
religions involved.

Policy Recommendations
My research shows that those seeking to counter Daesh’s recruitment and radicalization
propaganda should tailor any interventions around widely-respected Muslim religious leaders
and scholars who quote extensively from their sacred texts to publish peaceful messaging.
Counterpropaganda campaigns should find ways to amplify their peaceful messaging and enable
these Muslim leaders to delegitimize the radical, violent messaging of Daesh. This
recommendation is based on my research, which shows that Daesh most fears religious leaders
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who are co-religionist, widely respected, and have the capacity to discredit Daesh using
arguments that make extensive appeals to the sacred texts.
Further, these counterpropaganda campaigns should be ongoing operations. Violent,
radical, fundamentalist religious propaganda is not going away. In fact, I predict that it is only
just gaining momentum as other groups witness the success Daesh has met with and they begin
to emulate certain aspects of its campaign. Social media and the Internet continue to offer a free,
unlimited platform for such violent ideologies and the best strategy is produce, broadcast, and
disseminate peaceful religious propaganda continually, rather than wait for the next Daesh to
take us off guard. When Daesh first made its debut on the global stage, many governments, most
notably that of the United States, did not take it seriously, either as a military threat or as a sect
of Islam that had the capacity to use the religion to recruit such a strong and wide following.
Ongoing projects must monitor religious radicalization and inform other projects that conduct
ongoing peaceful counterpropaganda campaigns.
Interfaith interventions can still play a role, but are not likely to have much, if any, effect
on the potential recruits targeted by Daesh and other violent, fundamentalist, religious groups.
Interfaith interventions likely would provide religious leaders who already have a peaceful
agenda with a wider understanding of other religions that they might share with their
congregants, but these types of interventions are outside the focus of Daesh and similar groups,
and thus remain outside the focus of the implications of this research.

Future Research
Researchers might want to explore a number of avenues in this area. One question I would have
liked to answer more fully would have been to what extent being a co-sectarian might increase or
decrease a potential intervenor’s efficacy. In other words, I believe I have successfully measured
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the Co-Religionist Hypothesis empirically. However, my Concentric Rings Observation would
seem to indicate that, more specific than a co-religionist, a co-sectarian might prove even more
effective an intervenor than a co-religionist who is not a co-sectarian.
An area of future inquiry is the co-sectarian hypothesis. Daesh, standing out as a
sectarian group even among sectarians, has drawn its particular concentric ring so tiny that it
includes very few actual scholars. Unlike Al Qaeda, which has a reliable stable of scholars it can
reference to support its ideology, Daesh has made itself so extreme and in its own perspective
apostatized so vast a majority of fellow Muslims that it has almost completely alienated itself in
the realm of scholarship and legitimate religious authority. Exploring the Co-Sectarian
Hypothesis would be an extremely important field for further inquiry, because this would enable
researchers to look at the problem of radicalization and recruitment at a granular level. This
research could also enable counterpropaganda practitioners to assess the potential effectiveness
of individual scholars and religious leaders in countering violent propaganda.
Another area for further inquiry is exploring the role inter-faith interventions might play
to complement a co-religionist intervention. My research shows that the most effective figures to
stage an intervention with those who are likely to be recruited by a violent, fundamentalist
religious group would be co-religionists. But what about those who are not persuaded to join
such a group outright, but are sympathetic to it? Inter-faith dialogue interventions that target
religious leaders themselves, rather than their congregants, could be key in helping them steer
their congregations away from sectarianism and toward an appreciation of other sects and
religions.
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Another question worth pursuing is, how best might a counter-propaganda campaign
establish and maintain the legitimacy of the religious scholars and leaders it recruits to its cause?
My research might give indications, but it does not answer this definitively. The Countering
Daesh Propaganda project at The Carter Center refuses funding from the United States to avoid
the appearance of being a puppet of a foreign government – especially one that has demonstrated
terrible tone-deafness when it comes to Daesh.
These are among the many questions researchers might pursue that are related to the topic
of this dissertation. With this, however, I close my final chapter.
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